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In what follows, I highlight negative environmental perspectives and actions 
based on traditional patterns of Western dualist thought with the ultimate aim of 
developing an alternative way of relating to the environment and the ‘other’, in 
general.  In pursuit of such an alternative, I utilize embodied artistic practices in 
order to present the notion that one can engage more holistically with one’s 
environment, and the other.  Through habitual, lifelong ‚Ways‛ cultivating 
specific practices generally necessary to creating and to viewing art, I argue, one 
can refine one’s ethical awareness and action.  Following the aims of care ethics’ 
more context and experience-oriented approach to moral concern and to 
treatment of the other, as well as the philosophies of Japan, and feminist 
philosopher, Irigaray, I show how these artistic practices form a new awareness 
and stance that encompasses components of care.  Finally, I briefly highlight how 
art has been used for positive activism. 
 
Embodied Ethics: 
Transformation, Care, and Activism through Artistic Engagement 
 
I. Introduction 
Within the philosophies of several important thinkers in the Western 
tradition, dualist thought has been a hallmark.  In fact, the dualist mindset is a 
pervasive one that has influenced Western thought profoundly.  Dualisms have 
engendered separation of the ‘other’ from those holding power as the dominant 
class, as well as influenced the development of world perspectives in which 
hierarchical relationships abound.  Dualist philosophy has distinguished and 
elevated rationalism, in the form of the ego-based, internal consciousness known 
as ‘mind’, while the corporeal elements of an individual’s existence and of the 
natural world have been conceptually divided by rationalism, as well as 
accorded less value within society. 
 Devaluation of engaged interactions with one’s environment and 
inattentiveness to or denigration of those traits and entities relegated to 
‘otherness’ are negative outcomes emerging from this traditional system of 
Western dualist thought in which transcending the world has long been 
considered the ultimate way for humans to relate to it.  Within contemporary 
dualist paradigms, transcendence, rather than being a means of overcoming 
worldly existence (through the classical concept of life after death, for example), 
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has taken the form of domination of the physical world through dualisms and 
the traits that emerge from them, expanding their reach.   
 In my thesis, I explain how specific types of environmental justice issues 
stem from this dualist foundation and its progeny, and represent foundational 
problems that the new ethical paradigm I advance can help remedy  By first 
revealing various negative traits and actions that can be seen to represent a set of 
dualistic and distancing perspectives and habits related to the environment, such 
as colonization at the levels of microbiology, of land, and of culture, I work out 
an account of ways of creating alternative perspectives and habits through the 
model of bodily engagement and the creation of stronger intersubjective 
connections.   
 The ethical model I develop is based on the view that creating and 
strengthening intersubjective connections is a potent way to develop an ethical 
relationship in which ‘care’ becomes implicit.  By examining various ethical and 
cultural writings on bodily, engaged artistic practices, I assert that a deeper, 
more authentic understanding and nurturing of these connections can be a 
powerful tool for living ethically, and improving environmental and other justice 
issues so prevalent within our world.   
 The core of my argument is that artistic practices based on holistic 
physical engagement produce a significant refinement in the inspiration and 
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forging of vitally connected ethical relationships.  The corporeal and cognitive 
links emerging from enduring habits of bodily action and interaction with 
‘others’ are the keys to the self-cultivation needed to foster these ethical 
relationships, and to enhance eudaimonia within an individual’s life, as well. 
 While my primary focus is on the transformation within the individual 
artist practicing such bodily engagement, I also assert that those truly engaged in 
appreciating the works created by him or her will form similar dispositional and 
habitual ways of being.  Furthermore, groups of individuals who are 
participating in embodied/artistic practices or appreciation can, and have 
collaborated for social activism, and I will briefly highlight a few examples of 
these activist movements.  To recapitulate, while I assert that art is a unique 
realm, and not everyone possesses the ability to function on the most gifted 
artistic level, there are ways to integrate these inherently artistic practices into 
more quotidian aspects of life.  Such integration can produce a deeper, more 
prevalent ethics of care through personal dispositions and habits and more 
experiential educational paradigms.  
 In section II, to begin my project, I illustrate a general conception of the 
ethical importance of fostering intersubjective connections within structures of 
thought and action that have, so far, maintained implicit aspects of dualism.  
Utilizing, first, an overview of the negative aspects of dualisms, and then, a short 
4 
 
example, I reveal some basic elements of dualisms and lay the foundation for 
cultivating more beneficial alternative perspectives and habits.  By sketching 
some differing insights into dualisms through the work of Val Plumwood, John 
Dewey, John Russon, and Vandana Shiva, who represent ecofeminist, 
phenomenological, and pragmatist schools of thought that are all committed to 
moving beyond dualist thinking, I attempt to plant the seeds of possible 
alternative ways of relating ethically.  Next, by focusing on various negative 
environmental traits and actions and how they relate to various forms of power, I 
try to expand the understanding of intersubjective relations.   Moving through 
notions of how to understand power in more constructive ways leads to the 
theme of care within ethics and the way that elements of care function within 
and contribute to ethical relationships.   
 In part III, with the ethics of care as a context and an aim of the ethical 
practice I advance, I illustrate how different historical ethical paradigms situate 
the process of ‘practice’ within them.  Furthermore, I assert that utilizing specific 
embodied artistic practices – including ‘seeing’, creative imagining or artistic 
intuiting, playing and participating with and spontaneously relating to 
embodied materials, and uniting the conscious and unconscious – transforms the 
artist, and engenders a sense of openness and possibility to the other.  In turn, 
these practices lead to more caring relationship between entities generally 
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labeled as subject and object, including humans and the environment.  Finally, I 
assert that viewers who form sensitive habits of ‘seeing’, and attentiveness, to 
artistic works will share in the transformative process begun by the artist.  This 
process often impacts a community, and engenders a social component in which 
the audience and/or other artists, as individuals or groups, are emotionally 
affected and creatively inspired to perform acts of positive activism. 
II. The Importance of Connection in a Dualistic Society 
 As Val Plumwood explains in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 
within the rationalist traditions of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, and, 
alternatively, within the Christian world, dualistic constructions polarize the 
human and the non-human. This tradition incorporates both the natural 
environment and animals/animal nature and results in the creation of two 
distinct categories, ‚or orders of being in the world.‛ (Plumwood 1993, 70).  To 
illustrate dualisms stemming from this tradition, Plumwood points out the well-
known examples of ‚mind and body, humans and nature‛ (Plumwood 1993, 70).  
Furthermore, she stresses the prevalence of the dualist perspective by explaining 
that while similarity and continuity exist between humans and nature, Western 
views generally have stressed discontinuity (Plumwood 1993, 71).   
 Elucidating these perceptions of natural/human continuity slightly 
differently, in Art as Experience, pragmatist philosopher John Dewey points out 
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that while awe often surrounds the spheres of spirituality and the ‘‛ideal,‛’ by 
contrast, ‘the term ‛matter‛ indicates devaluation, and the representation of 
something requiring justification of its moral worth (Dewey 1934, 5).  Dewey 
challenges that view by asserting that humans actually possess ‚the same vital 
needs‛ as non-human animals and that therefore, continuity exists at a primal 
level between humans and the environment, because   
man derives the means by which he breathes, moves, looks and list the 
very brain with which he coordinates his senses and his movements, from 
his animal forbears.  .  .  [L]ife goes on in an environment;  not merely in it 
but because of it, through interaction with it.  
(Dewey 1934, 12)   
The perspectives behind historical conceptualizations of discontinuity, on the 
other hand, locate human virtue in human differences from nature (Plumwood 
1993, 71).  Therefore, the traits of human value ‚exclude those aspects associated 
with the body, sexuality, reproduction, affectivity, emotionality, the senses and 
dependence on the natural world‛ because these traits are also representative of 
nature and animals (Plumwood 1993, 71).   
 This view holds that reason is the significant trait that endows humans 
with humanity and separates them from ‚the sphere of nature‛ (Plumwood 1993, 
71).  Plumwood utilizes a quote by William James, a pragmatist like Dewey, to 
emphasize one of her major reasons for discussing such dualistic conceptions.          
 ‚Discontinuity is obtained via an account of human identity and virtue 
 which  eliminates overlap with the ‘animal within’, or polarizes this as not 
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 truly part of the self or as belonging to a lower, baser ‘animal’ part of self.  
 The human species  is thus defined out of nature, and nature is conceived 
 as so alien to humans that  they can ‘establish no moral communion’ with 
 it (James 1896:  43).‛     
       (Plumwood 1993, 71) 
The idea that humans ‚can ‘establish no moral communion’‛ with nature is one 
of the main underlying reasons compelling Plumwood to write about dualisms, 
as well as the reason that dualisms represent more than a mere method for 
differentiating between species.   
 By writing of dualisms, she unpacks the basis, often unacknowledged, of 
humans’ moral stance toward the non-human world, as well as toward various 
elements of the human one that are deeply associated with nature.  Clearly 
describing dualisms, then, leads to the ability to see why many humans, 
especially in the West, take a moral stance that denigrates nature, as well as to 
the possibility of prescribing a more thoughtful, just, and mutually beneficial 
position. 
The Relationship of Environmental Justice to Engaged Ethics 
Traits that work against Nature and Environmental Justice  
 
 While several environmental justice concerns, including conservation, 
access to and utilization of resources, and ‚development,‛ appear to be general 
practical concerns, on further reflection, it becomes clear that questions and 
solutions related to them vary greatly depending on the particular perspective 
underlying them.  One could isolate several attitudes that are detrimental to the 
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environment.  Often, these attitudes are rooted in a philosophical tradition, like 
Cartesian dualism, and have become so entrenched in everyday life that they 
remain unacknowledged as an influence on decision-making related to the 
environment.  Therefore, I highlight four features of world-orientations, often 
unacknowledged, that produce profoundly devastating effects on the 
environment.  These perspectives often appear together, forming a destructive 
stance toward the environment in general, and toward environmental justice 
issues, as well.   
 The four elements – dualisms, reductionism, viewing/treating nature and 
culture as discontinuous, and colonization – form or intensify these destructive 
world orientations.  Furthermore, because humans are often categorized in 
hierarchies as ‘closer to’ or ‘further from’ nature, they too, suffer from the 
structural injustices undergirded by these views. 
 Dualisms are relationships between two elements, or objects, based on 
power.  The dominant-subordinate interaction within a dualism is often 
naturalized through the dualist relationship, entrenching a master/subordinate 
relationship that comes to be seen as, merely, reality, and not an interpretation of 
it.  Reductionism is a way of oversimplifying a system, often a natural one, that 
allows groups or individuals to interact with the elements of it in a manner that 
discounts much of the overall diversity within it.  Looking at the elements from a 
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narrow view, reductionism tends to value a system for a simple, under-
representative group of traits within it, that are chosen by the dominant group or 
individual, the master, to allow for maximal exploitation of it.   
 Viewing/treating nature and culture as discontinuous, separate elements, 
parallels the dualist way of subordinating nature to culture.  I emphasize and 
distinguish this attitude from dualisms, however, due to its pervasiveness within 
daily life, as well as for the way that it has traditionally led to denigration of 
various aspects of the world—whether dubbed natural or human.  Finally, 
colonization, while sharing some of the elements of reductionism, is a more 
active, conscious approach to relegating people and things to a lower level of 
value, and, often, appropriating much of their resources as well.            
 In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val Plumwood unearths both 
general and specific ways in which traditional philosophical and cultural 
structures have steered and sometimes distorted questions relating to cultural 
and environmental concerns within the global community.  By unpacking 
conceptual dualism, she demonstrates that underlying what seem like obvious 
issues, such as environmental injustices and development issues, exist more 




Implicit Dualisms, Their Basic Structural Features 
 The term ‘dualism,’ though tending to generate fairly clear-cut 
impressions, such as ‘difference’ or ‘dichotomy,’ is a much more loaded concept 
than these ideas suggest (Plumwood 1993, 47).  Throughout her book on 
feminism and nature, Plumwood continually refines the definition of dualism to 
include the nuanced way in which it affects relationships and social structures.  
At its most basic, dualism is a logical, conceptual tool developed through a 
historical process, used by dominant groups to create and to entrench a model of 
power between two elements, what Plumwood calls the ‘master model’ 
(Plumwood 1993, 31).  Though the components within the dualism may differ, it 
is possible, and even likely, that they are not ‘naturally’ opposed to each other—
take reason and emotion as an example (Plumwood 1993, 51). 
 In order to illuminate the reason/emotion dualism, I turn to John Russon’s 
writing from Human Experience:  Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of 
Everyday Life on the concept of mood in which he states that moods are not, as 
generally considered, ‚of secondary significance‛ (Russon 2003, 43).  Though 
mood is not necessarily synonomous with emotion, it can be thought of as an 
everpresent condition similar to emotion, what Heidegger would call a 
fundamental attunement.  Russon asserts that individuals’ ‚primary way of 
knowing reality‛ is through mood, and that it is the basis for what he calls, the 
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‚more developed and reflective acts of knowing‛ (Russon 2003, 43).  Moods, 
according to Russon, are one’s ‚immediate sensitivity, the immediate way in 
which.  .   .‛ someone experiences ‚the demands of objectivity‛ (Russon 2003, 44).   
 Russon quotes Heidegger’s interpretation of cognition and moods, in 
which Heidegger states:  ‘‛*T+he possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition 
fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods in which Dasein is brought 
before its being as the there,‛’ which Russon interprets as moods’ initial 
unlocking of the world to the individual’s experience, the interface between 
world and self (Russon 2003, 43, quoting Heidegger 1962).  The self, this 
suggests, is not conscious of its moods, and only perceives them through their 
filtering of perception.  Because moods are ‚not manifest as self-perception,‛  
however, they are often dismissed, or when acknowledged, treated as separate 
elements of experience (Russon 2003, 43-44).  ‚*R+eflective life is itself one of the 
developments of our moods‛ (Russon 2003, 43).  Therefore, relating ‚to a 
situation is always to be in some mood or other‛ (Russon 2003, 43).  In terms of 
reason and emotion specifically, furthermore, Russon states, 
 The mood required for rational discourse is a mood of calm, but also a 
 mood  enthusiastic about pursuing the implications of various ideas and 
 so on.  It is not tenable to distinguish some people as emotional from some 
 who are not, or some experiences as being emotional and some not.  
        (Russon 2003, 43-44) 
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Mood, therefore, is an instance that effectively illustrates that the nature of 
reason and emotion is non-dualistic, inseparable, and intertwined within the 
individual.        
 Regarding art, and foregrounding what I will discuss in section III, John 
Dewey states that ‘in ‚rationalistic‛ philosophies of art . . . a fixed separation of 
sense and reason’ exists (Dewey 1934, 269).  He asserts, however, that artworks 
are ‚so obviously sensuous and yet contain*s+ such wealth of meaning,‛ that they 
cancel out this separation, and constitute ‚an embodiment through sense of the 
logical structure of the universe‛ (Dewey 1934, 269).  The rationalistic theory 
generally considers sense perception as a means of distorting the reality ‚behind 
appearances,‛ however, by employing the materials of the senses in art, 
imagination exists in sensual form while also suggesting ‚underlying ideal 
truth*s+‛ (Dewey 1934, 269).  This emphasis on the intrinsically intertwined 
nature of the senses and the universal elements of life becomes a central concern 
relating to intersubjectivity within the Japanese arts and Luce Irigaray’s ethics of 
alterity as well, which I discuss in a later section.        
 Contrasting this sense of continuity, however, the practice of presenting 
objects, people, or traits within a dualistic association, such as that of 
reason/emotion, places entities in opposition to each other, as reason and 
emotion typically are.  The creation of a dualistic relationship, furthermore, is 
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often strategic, according to Plumwood, since dualisms go beyond the realm of 
thought, or concept, encompassing practical effects and fulfilling justifications for 
concrete forms of ‚domination and accumulation‛ (Plumwood 1993, 42).  
Through this constructed opposition, one of the dualistic elements is 
subordinated/inferiorized to the dominant/superior one and placed in a ‚sphere 
of otherness,‛ the realm of the allegedly vast difference that dualisms convey, 
from which there is no escaping.   
 The dominant, or master, denies and devalues its dependency on the 
excluded other because the master presents the dualism as a natural relationship 
(Plumwood 1993, 41, 47).  As the product of history and evolution, dualisms 
have accumulated over time and may be integrated into new cultural contexts 
when traditional ones become obsolete (Plumwood 1993, 43).  Within modern 
U.S. politics, for instance, colonization and appropriation of Native American 
lands, as effects of dualisms, have taken on new forms.  While they still function 
to devalue indigenous culture, the forms utilized now are more subtle and more 
institutionalized than previous forms.   
 For example, laws, which may appear to help a particular group, may 
distort an issue or be directed against those that they should affect positively.  
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, makes it necessary for Native American 
‚artists to prove their Native heritage‛ (Bird 1998, 27).  The law not only protects 
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‚investors in Indian art rather than the interests of Native people,‛ it also divides 
Native Americans over Native descent and identity issues (Bird 1998, 27).    
Furthermore, since dualisms exist as a ‚set of interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing‛ pairs that pervade Western culture, they tend to remain intact and 
infuse their logic within the conceptual system as a whole, while precluding 
change (Plumwood 1993, 42, 48). 
The Aspects of Dualism 
 Plumwood introduces five features, or aspects, of dualisms:  1) 
backgrounding (denial); 2) radical exclusion (hyperseparation);  3) incorporation 
(relational definition); 4) instrumentalization (objectification); and 5) 
homogenization or stereotyping.  These elements may occur in various 
combinations, but some, or all of them, are present when dualism exists.  
Backgrounding is the master’s fear-based reaction to his/her need of the 
slave/subordinate as a means of identity creation and of material provisioning 
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49).  Because ‚it is the slave who makes the master a 
master,‛ the master denies the other’s contribution, often through a ‚hierarchy of 
activities,‛ in which the necessity of the slave’s contribution is denied 
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49).   For example, while traditionally the labor of women 
in the ‘private sphere’ throughout the world provides a vital foundation for the 
functioning of family, society, and ‘public sphere’ economics, it is often 
15 
 
unacknowledged or dismissed.  Even though the health of individuals and 
cultures, and much of the basis of economic activity is supported by many of 
these activities—like the numerous hours that women in many countries must 
walk to gather water used for various functions—those in the dominant position 
ignore these contributions (Waring 2009, 166-67).  As Marilyn Waring states 
regarding policy and acknowledgement of women’s economic and labor 
contributions:  ‚if you are invisible as a producer in a nation’s economy, you are 
invisible in the distribution of benefits (unless they label you a welfare ‘problem’ 
or ‘burden’)‛  (Waring 2009, 165). 
 Radical exclusion, one of the main indicators of dualism, is a form of 
differentiation where the master perceives and presents the other as being within 
a completely distinguishable and lower level of existence (Plumwood 1993, 49).  
The master emphasizes differences and attempts to eliminate similarity 
completely so that there is a clear delineation between it and the other 
(Plumwood 1993, 49).  Additionally, through this process, dominant groups can 
explain different moral luck through the seemingly objective filter of individual 
‘natures’, which leads to protection of privileged groups (Plumwood 1993, 49).   
Plumwood thus emphasizes that practical dichotomies are genealogically prior 
to the dualisms that they support and that come to be understood as 
metaphysical truth.   
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Ultimately, domination comes to be seen as natural because ‚What is 
actually a sociological point comes to be labeled as being biological, or 
preferably, metaphysical (Memmi 1965:  71-2)‛ (Plumwood 1993, 51).  
Categorization of people into masculine or feminine gender, or the association of 
the feminine with nature, for example, has long been considered to be based 
exclusively on objective qualities.  However, gender difference is actually socially 
constructed by connecting human materiality to mystified ‘symbolic nature’ 
(Salleh 2009, 9-10).  Dualistic views of gender encompass constructed elements, 
such as women’s ‘inherent’ closeness to nature and man’s universality, as if they 
were objective designations, when really, they are means used to continue a cycle 
of subordination for female and natural others (Salleh 2009, 10).   
 Incorporation is a way of defining/perceiving the other only as it relates to 
and reflects the master’s characteristics, wants, and needs (Plumwood 1993, 52).  
Because the models of power and society are constructed by the master, society 
comes to value his/her traits, and consider the other’s as the expression of lack 
(Plumwood 1993, 44).  Through incorporation (and radical exclusion) the master 
can create the appearance that the other lacks complete independence and 
autonomy because the other opposes the essence of what makes the master 
independent—whatever traits that the master establishes.   However, even 
though the master may have subjugated the other through its dualism, it does 
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not logically follow that the other is naturally inferior, or lacks the ability for 
freedom and autonomy.  It is actually the master who finds identity through the 
devaluation of the other.  That is, by categorizing the traits of the other as inferior 
to its own, the master arbitrarily elevates whatever traits it possesses through the 
denigrating of the opposing traits of those it dominates. 
 Instrumentalism is a powerful aspect of the dualistic structure.  Taking the 
master as the center of society and of moral judgment, instrumentalism, along 
with incorporation, reduces the autonomy of the other in another way:  it utilizes 
the other as a mere means to ends defined by the master (Plumwood 1993, 53).  
Like incorporation, instrumentalism further distances the other from the master 
by regarding him/her as devoid of intrinsic value, and only as possessing value 
as a resource (Plumwood 1993, 53). 
 Homogenization reinforces the other aspects of dualism by ignoring 
diversity and distinctions within ‚inferior‛ groups concerning myriad features of 
life, including language, culture, and social organization.  This generalizing of 
others and separating of self, carried out by the master, lead to the establishment 
of a binary world order (Plumwood 1993, 53-54).  Whatever group the master 
colonizes loses both:  continuity with other individuals (especially those in the 
‘master’ group), as well as individuality—in other words, radical exclusion and 
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homogenization complement one another strongly.  As Marilyn Frye states in her 
discussion of gender stereotyping and homogenization:   
 ‚To make *domination+ seem natural, it will help if it seems to all 
 concerned that members of the two groups are very different from each 
 other, and this appearance is enhanced if it can be made to appear that 
 within each group, the members are very like one another.‛  
        (Plumwood 1993, 54) 
Internal and External ‘Otherness’     
 Dualisms relegate the body and the emotions to the position of ‘otherness’ 
within the individual.  Similarly, elements of the ‚external world‛:  nature, 
determined as human ‘others’, as animals, and as objects, fulfill the position of 
the subordinate ‘other’ in the worldly realm beyond the individual.  Dominant 
patterns of Western thought categorize bodily activities as ‚mere‛ expressions of 
nature and of emotion, possessing less value within a system that prizes pursuits 
it deems purely rational.   
 ‚Much of the development of modernity has involved encoding the 
rationality and properties‛ of the ‘master subject’, what Plumwood dubs 
‚Rational Economic Man,‛ into ‚apparently impersonal, bureaucratic 
mechanisms and institutions‛ (Plumwood 2002, 32).  This encoding, brands these 
properties as impartial or objective and, hence, also as rational.  (Plumwood 
2002, 32).  It follows that nature and bodily engagement, on the other hand, are 
devalued by this system, seen as mindless, savage, and even ‘outside ‚civilized 
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society‛ (Mies 1986: 75)’ (Plumwood 1993, 107).  In fact, inherent in the Western 
concept of mind is the view of the corporeal ‘other’ at minimum, as separate 
from prized rationality, and often, with destructive consequences, as inferior.  
 Plumwood illustrates this perspective through what she calls the ‘Rational 
Economy’, in which these dominant patterns of thought categorize as a positive 
form of rationality, almost any human means of subduing and ordering nature to 
human specifications (Plumwood 1993, 107, 193).  This approach, like 
instrumental rationality, utilizes reason to decide how to best achieve one’s ends 
without actually reasoning about the value of the ends themselves.  As one 
analyzes dualistic thinking in more depth, however, it becomes apparent that the 
‚rationalism‛ of actions that order nature based almost exclusively on various 
human priorities, if taken to its logical conclusion, is actually irrational.   
In the detailed discussion that follows, I analyze how dualisms and other 
negative traits affect the environment.  Their destructive mechanisms suggest 
that actions generally considered ‘economically rational’ are actually irrational.  
Ultimately, these traits and the actions they engender, if unchecked, inevitably 
lead to the destruction of the human economy because they destroy the natural 
resources necessary for its continued functioning.  Even more importantly, these 
behaviors reduce myriad positive elements – natural, social, and others – to 
merely an economically based assessment of profitability.     
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 Those in power, within this model, elevate themselves to a status that 
naturalizes their power by distancing themselves from the devalued natural 
world.  Transcendence, in this sense, represents the function of domination and 
of control of the world through those deemed ‘other’ in the pursuit of the 
master’s own ends.  By removing oneself conceptually from nature, dominant 
groups utilize ‚the rationality of the monologue,‛ a mode of communication in 
which only the conceptions of the dominant side are valued in what should be a 
communicative discourse.  This monologue, however, actually functions as a uni-
directional mode of communication, devoid of interaction between subject and 
object.  The voice of the subordinate ‘other’ goes unheard, or at least, unheeded.  
The dominant group finds value in the ‘other’ only in its capacity to provide for, 
and define itself as master (Plumwood 2002, 19).      
A Contemporary Scenario Regarding Distance and Dualism   
 As previously stated, the dualist paradigm affects thought and behavior 
on several levels in an often ethically damaging manner.  One simple example 
that highlights how dualisms intensify negative effects within ethical 
relationships emerges from the advancements in technology within 
contemporary society.  At this time in history, technology makes it possible to do 
many things in many places without actually being ‚there,‛ not truly being 
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present, nor actually engaging in the performance of the given activity, or doing 
so without reflection or mindfulness.  
 With the advancement in computerized and mechanized machines that 
facilitate lightly pressing a button to produce numerous outcomes, the very 
mechanism of cause and effect, in some tangible sense, becomes obscured.  This 
situation often causes an individual to become or remain deficient in 
understanding or intuiting whether he or she is using another in a negatively 
dualistic way.  Because whatever effect the individual desires can be carried out 
somewhat automatically, he or she has little awareness of the negative outcome 
of his or her actions. 
 The convenience of technology, therefore, diminishes one’s 
understanding of the effects of his or her actions because of the distance between 
the agent and the action and its effects.  Furthermore, similar to the instrumental 
type of rationalism at work in Plumwood’s ‚Rational Economy,‛ the use of 
technology aids one in reaching one’s ends without deliberation about their 
value.  That is, by using a machine, for example, to weed a garden, one may 
easily lose sight of whether the given results are even desirable because very 
little thought is put into an activity that one is less connected to corporeally.  
While many technological conveniences allow for superficial life improvements 
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and more efficient means of producing their varied results, I question what such 
changes in the way individuals act and interact mean for ethics?   
 In some instances, automating activities that were formerly done by hand 
leads to habits that prevent deliberation about the ways in which the action 
affects others.  Take the example of gardening, specifically, weeding a garden.  
An individual who is weeding by hand must observe and discriminate between 
the types of plants that are growing in the attempt to keep a healthy balance 
within the garden.  It is helpful to relate this idea to Robert E. Carter’s statement, 
in The Japanese Arts and Self-Cultivation, about leaving an everyday 
environment in order to enter a garden.  By physically being in a garden, ‚*o+ne 
is not only in the garden, but now one is a part of the garden:  not a visitor any 
longer, but a participant‛ (Carter 2008, 54).  When weeding, one pulls out those 
weeds and plants considered to be extraneous, unhealthy for the ecosystem of 
the specific type of garden and, in this way, is actually a part of the garden’s 
functioning.  
 The bodily act of grasping and pulling out the weeds, knowing they will 
die, may lend a sense of responsibility to the activity.  On the other hand, if 
someone uses a ‘weed-wacker’, he/she becomes less discriminating in 
performing this endeavor since it is easy to alter a whole garden within minutes, 
without a second thought.  When weeding by hand, an individual is more likely 
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to develop a personal sense of the patterns of growth within the garden.  One 
likely acquires an understanding of the weeds’ and plants’ resilience and life-
force, and the garden—even the weeds—is seen as a dynamic natural system, 
rather than an inert objectified space where a flick of the switch can allow one to 
raze a mini-ecosystem for one’s own purposes alone.  This leads to the ‚feeling of 
kinship‛ with the elements in the garden, the knowledge that the self is 
interconnected with them (Carter 2008, 69).  The garden, though altered by 
weeding, when done with deliberation and understanding, is not as likely to be 
subordinated within a dualistic paradigm.  It and its various components are 
more likely to be given consideration in their own right, as more than means 
reduced to the master’s/weeder’s ends. 
 Reductionism 
‚Reducing organic wholes to fragmented, separable and substitutable parts has 
been the reductionist method of going beyond nature’s limits‛ (Shiva 1993, 28). 
 Reductionism, as described by Vandana Shiva in her essay, 
‚Reductionism and Regeneration:  A Crisis in Science,‛ is based, 
epistemologically and ontologically, on specific assumptions about the natural 
world.  These assumptions, according to Shiva, include ‚uniformity, perceiving 
all systems as comprising the same basic constituents, discrete, and atomistic, 
and assuming all basic processes to be mechanical‛ (Shiva 1993, 23).  Under a 
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reductionist paradigm girded by ‚the assumption of divisibility and 
manipulability,‛ one views the natural world as ‚a machine‛ (Shiva 1993, 23).   
 Earlier historical ‘organic metaphors’, however, saw human groups as 
considering power to be grounded ‚on interdependence and reciprocity‛ (Shiva 
1993, 23).  Within her essay, Shiva quotes Carolyn Merchant’s argument that the 
reductionist versions of economy, technology, and science, have propagated a 
mechanist view of reality, in which reality is viewed ‘‛as a machine, rather than a 
living organism‛ (Merchant 1980)’ (Shiva 1993, 24).  This view, furthermore, has, 
Merchant states, ‘‚sanctioned the domination of both nature and women‛ 
(Merchant 1980)’ Shiva 1993, 24).  I would add that these incarnations of 
reductionism have also systematically devalued non-dominant forms of 
knowledge (‘subjugated knowledges’), and non-dominant cultures and races, as 
well, by discounting the value of knowing about those parts of the system seen 
as unimportant to the master, like mechanisms of indigenous forestry and 
farming practices (Shiva 1993, 24).   
 Shiva categorizes the domination of which Merchant speaks as ‚the 
violation of integrity,‛ ‚inherently violent‛ (Shiva 1993, 24) and sees the 
epistemological and ontological ‚assumptions of reductionism‛ as related to one 
another.  Uniformity and divisibility are key to the way that reductionism 
functions.  Uniformity, similar to Plumwood’s concept of homogenization, or 
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stereotyping, sanctions seeing information relating to fragments within a system 
as signifying an understanding ‚of the whole,‛ (Shiva 1993, 24).  Though 
elements may be different and serve different purposes, the aspects that the 
master deems important define the whole, while the other parts are trivialized.   
For instance, in the former example involving gardening and the distance 
coming from the use of a weed-whacker, the garden serves a particular self-
interested purpose for the master/weeder at the expense of other aspects of the 
its existence.   
By using this distancing technology, the gardener comes to find certain 
elements important to him/her, likely dismissing or ignoring many functions of 
the garden that constitute an ecosystem in its own right.  Divisibility, like 
Plumwood’s radical exclusion, or hyperseparation, removes knowledge from its 
context.  Furthermore, divisibility makes some forms of knowledge that are 
detached—unrelated to the context of the physical world—dominant, and 
marginalizes the divided, ignored, or devalued contextual knowledge (Shiva 
1993, 24).  Shiva emphasizes that those who make a claim to ‘objectivity’, are 
often mistaking it for what is actually a distorted theoretical, abstracted 




 Shiva assesses reductionism as the logical epistemological basis used to 
efficiently serve the needs of a capitalist ‚economic and political organization‛ 
(Shiva 1993, 24).  Her interpretation asserts that within the reductionist world-
orientation, economic capitalism and ‚the industrial revolution‛ fulfill the 
‚philosophical, technological and economic components of the same process,‛ 
that of improving efficiency.  In this scenario a majority of corporations measure 
efficiency as the maximization of profits with little to no consideration for the toll 
on the ecological or social components of society (Shiva 1993, 24).   
 With this orientation as the basis for decisions regarding the environment, 
with the valuing of only the profitable elements within ‚resource systems,‛ often 
procured ‚through exploitation and extraction,‛ ecosystems are reduced to 
single components with single functions.  This leads to the destruction of those 
natural (stabilizing ecological) processes that exist in their own right and do not 
lead to profit (Shiva 1993, 24).  Using the forest, Shiva provides a powerful 
example of reductionism that is legitimized by science due to the increase of 
overall productivity (Shiva 1993, 25).  Here, reductionism truncates the 
components of the forest ‚to commercial wood,‛ and reduces wood ‚to cellulose 
fibre for the pulp and paper industry‛ (Shiva 1993, 25).  Regardless of the 
consequences to the forest as a whole, to its diversity and natural functions, the 
increase in productivity trumps all other concerns. 
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 In this way, reductionist science is at the root of the growing ecological 
 crisis, because it entails a transformation of nature that destroys its 
 organic processes and rhythms and regenerative capacities.  
           (Shiva 1993, 25) 
 
 Within the reductionist structure, continuity with nature, relationships to 
nature, and the various functions of natural processes are devalued while profits 
are prized.  The ecological processes of nature are instrumentalized and 
backgrounded, their contributions to society discounted.  Interactions with 
nature may have value and productivity on many levels.  However, if these 
exchanges are less profitable economically than others, the monoculture profit 
system erases them conceptually, totally ignoring their intrinsic, non-monetary 
value.  Here again, those who form a healthy interdependence within 
relationships, often including those with nature, in what I will later introduce as 
an intimacy-based world orientation, are discounted by those who possess a 
distanced relationship and utilize a reductive approach to nature based on 
profitability. 
   In her essay, ‚Immersed in Words,‛ Roberta J. Hill expresses a way of 
relating with nature that is counter to that of reductionism.  She states, ‚*a+ subtle 
communion and communication sometimes take place between human beings 
and other beings on the earth‛ (Hill 1998, 88).  Her poem, ‚A Presence That 
Found Me Again, Again‛ honors a wild plum tree, while illuminating how the 
tree gave her ‚the energy to go on‛ throughout years of struggle through an 
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‚emotional interaction taking place between the plum tree and me‛ (Hill 1998, 
90).  The second stanza reveals how humans can perceive and relate to nature in 
a variety of ways including an empathic one.  
 Wild plum ripe as ever 
 along the river even then 
 you invited faith in feeling 
 offered me as sky when the sky gleamed  
 blue as my first mother’s milk 
 buoyed me over swamp and coulee 
 like notes of a long lost melody 
 When I gleaned grief 
 you  another reaper  shook your red 
 skirt in leafy shadows 
   (Hill 1998, 89) 
 This response to natural elements follows what Plumwood calls ‚the intentional 
recognition stance,‛ a counter-hegemonic practice  
 of openness and recognition able to make us aware of agentic and 
 dialogical potentialities of earth others that are closed off to us in the  
 reductive model that strips intentional qualities from out of nature.   
     (Plumwood 2002, 177) 
This stance opens ‚our perceptual possibilities‛ to forms of intentionality and 
intelligence, such as ‚pheromone-based, sonar based and pollen-based 
sensitivities and chemical communication systems‛ (Plumwood 2002, 177, 180).  
Through it, Plumwood argues, modes of communication come to be recognized 
as including much more than the modes used by humans (Plumwood 2002, 189-
190).  Furthermore, she suggests that communicability, under this model, 
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includes ‚places, experiences, processes, encounters, projects, virtues, situations, 
methodologies and forms of life‛ (Plumwood 2002, 190).   
 Artistic practice can inspire these ‚dialogical modes of encounter‛ that aid 
in the ultimate ability to treat others, including non-human animals and nature, 
with a more caring ethical attitude that acknowledges them as  ‚potentially 
intentional and communicative being*s+ and narrative subject*s+‛ (Plumwood 
2002, 190). Themes relevant to this mode of encounter, like ‚emotional 
responsiveness‛ and ‚attunement to .  .   . particular contexts‛ are neglected 
within ‚rationalist ethics,‛ however (Plumwood 2002, 187).   
 Alternatively, by utilizing a more feminist line of ethical concern, quoting 
Margaret Walker, Plumwood asserts that,  
 ‚This view does not imagine our moral understandings *as+ congealed 
 into a compact theoretical instrument of impersonal decision, [such as  
 rights or value] but as deployed in shared processes of discovery, 
 expression, interpretation, and adjustment between persons.‛  
      (Plumwood 2002, 187)        
Though herself participating in such intense and dialogical experiences with 
others in nature, Hill realizes that experiences such as those expressed through 
her poem, often go unexpressed and unfulfilled.  This, she believes, is due to the 
West’s denial of non-human intelligence and worth (Hill 1998, 90).   
 [D]ominant values complicate honest emotional relationships between 
 human beings in order to insert a commodity mentality.  .  .  The same 
 system also forces us to deny insights of believing in a universe at one 
 with a spiritual intelligence.  In a culture where all beings can be sold and 
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 exchanged and made into objects of commerce, all beings are imagined to 
 be without consciousness.  .  .  Even relationships between human beings 
 are devalued in order to sell things.       
        (Hill 1998, 90) 
 Reductionism, as a ‚mechanistic metaphor,‛ therefore, develops the 
‚measure of value‛ as an almost exclusively monetary one (Shiva 1993, 25).  The 
valuation of a single uniform element of life, money, which is isolated at the 
expense of a diversity of differing values aside from the fiscal is, in itself, a 
reductive act.  This way of measuring value, furthermore, develops the means of 
destroying what the system deems valueless (Shiva 1993, 25).  ‚It creates the 
possibility of colonizing and controlling that which is free and self-generative‛ 
(Shiva 1993, 25).  Under this rubric, those considered experts add value to the 
‘raw’ material that ‚*n+ature, women and non-white people‛ provide (Shiva 
1993, 25). 
 Take the example of the reduction of reproduction in plants through the 
‚*c+olonization of the seed‛ (Shiva 1993, 28-29).  Deeming the natural 
regenerative cycles of nature as obstacles that slow down the ability to procure 
profit, corporations have divided seeds into various types:  those that produce 
food, and those that become a commodity (Shiva 1993, 29).  Those who colonize 
seed by genetically engineering it, reduce its value merely to its ability to 
produce profits for their companies.    
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 One of Shiva’s major points about the colonization of seed highlights the 
irony of exploiting nature, as well as those human beings who function 
interdependently with it.  ‚Modern plant-breeding,‛ she states, is predominantly 
a way to remove the ‚biological obstacle‛ in marketing seed, the ‚biological 
obstacle‛ being the seed’s ‚inherent ability to regenerate and multiply‛ (Shiva 
1993, 29).  Seeds are engineered to yield more, but require a greater contribution 
of external elements like water and fertilizer.  The major key to profiting from 
seed has become the development of strains that are unable to reproduce 
themselves, and that cannot be saved and reused.  No longer a common 
resource, then, seeds become a commodity, and for those groups who had long 
utilized them to live, Shiva adds, ‚an instrument of poverty and 
underdevelopment‛ (Shiva 1993, 29).     
 Erosion of genetic material within the seeds, and deprivation of the ability 
to utilize the formerly common resource by local farmers, are two distinct 
outcomes of seed colonization (Shiva 1993, 30).  By deliberately genetically 
engineering seeds so that they no longer reproduce as they naturally did, those 
seeking to reduce seed to profit, work to control its natural reproductive 
function.  In this way, they alter nature for their own shortsighted and personal 
advantage.  Ironically, the definitionally regenerative properties of ‘non-
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commoditized’ seed become subservient to technology and culture in order to 
regenerate only when manipulated by them (Shiva 1993, 30).      
Viewing Nature/Culture as Discontinuous 
‚Now the categories of ‚nature‛ and ‚culture‛ are of course conceptual 
categories—one can find no boundary out in the actual world between the two 
states or realms of being‛  (Ortner 1974, 6). 
 While there is much scientific knowledge within such fields as 
evolutionary biology mapping connections between human and non-human 
nature, the view that nature and culture lack continuity is ‚deeply and fatally 
entrenched‛ in the modern Western human/nature model in the form of the 
radical exclusion dualism that emphasizes difference. (Plumwood 1993, 6).  
Plumwood points out that many modern environmental scholars, such as David 
Suzuki, advance the theme of continuity and interdependence between species as 
necessary for ‚a healthy biosphere.‛ (Plumwood 1993, 6). 
Much of modern society, however, as evidenced by its reductive values, 
views the theme of continuity and interdependence as ‚revolutionary‛ due to the 
long history of the human/nature dualism.   This history has functioned in a way 
that creates the illusion that domination of humans, as well as of non-humans, is 
an effect of naturally occurring power relations, not to be questioned, in which 
one group distances itself from another in an attempt to exclude the other and 
place it in a subordinate sphere (Plumwood 1993, 6). 
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 When a dominant group treats nature and culture as dualistically related, 
differences are emphasized and shared qualities are eliminated, or treated ‚as 
inessential,‛ in order ‚to achieve maximum separation‛ (Plumwood 1993, 49).  
For example, one way that those within a subordinated race or ethnicity are 
labeled as very different from those in power and very similar to each other is by 
lumping them together through racist stereotypical labeling—such as phrases 
asserting that African Americans or Asians ‘all look alike’.   As Sherry Ortner 
states, in her essay ‚Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?‛ all cultures 
tacitly recognize and assert ‚a distinction between the operation of nature and 
the operation of culture (human consciousness and its products)‛ (Ortner 1974, 
7).  Culture, furthermore, distinguishes itself through its general ability to 
‚transcend natural conditions and turn them to its purposes‛ (Ortner 1974, 7).   
 The ability to control nature—‘to ‚socialize‛ and ‚culturalize‛-nature’ – 
therefore, has allowed human culture to use non-human nature, and those who 
are associated with it, for its ends.  This ability, ‚at some level of awareness,‛ 
leads human culture to perceive itself as more than simply different from nature.  
Due to its capacity and desire to transform nature, humans, as the progenitors of 
culture, actually view themselves as superior to it (Ortner 1974, 7).   Viewing the 
world from this long-held perspective of discontinuity promotes decision-
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making that disassociates culture from its deep connection with non-human 
nature.  
 In contrast to this perspective of discontinuity, John Dewey, in Art as 
Experience, again counters this dualistic separation of nature and culture, by 
asserting that the endurance of civilization and culture ‚is evidence that human 
hopes and purposes find a basis and support in nature‛ (Dewey 1934, 28).   
Highlighting the individual human life-cycle ‚from embryo to maturity,‛ Dewey 
labels culture as the product stemming from an organism’s ‚prolonged and 
cumulative interaction with environment‛—its (natural) surroundings, rather 
than the ‚efforts of men put forth in a void or just upon themselves‛ (Dewey 
1934, 28).  Dewey illustrates an additional idea that I will touch on in Section IV, 
noting how  
 [t]he depth of the responses stirred by works of art shows their continuity 
 with the operations of this enduring experience.  The works and the 
 responses they evoke are continuous with the very processes of living as 
 these are carried to unexpected happy fulfillment.  
        (Dewey 1934, 28)   
    
 All of the philosophy that attempts to reframe the relationship between 
humans and nature, reinterprets Cartesian dualisms.  The ‚post-Cartesian 
project‛ related to acknowledging continuity between nature and culture, and to 
developing intersubjectivity, is that of ‚rediscovering the ‘body in the mind’‛ 
(Plumwood 2002, 179).  Through ideas such as ‚’speaking matter,’‛ introduced 
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by Luce Irigaray and other feminist philosophers, this method attempts to locate 
and develop a foundation for an understanding of ‚’continuity between mind 
and nature’‛ that is non-reductive (Plumwood 2002, 179).   
Those artists who work with the elements/elementals, such as earth artists 
and architect/sculptor Maya Lin, and viewer responses to them, will provide 
some examples of overcoming a negative sense of discontinuity.  For instance, 
Amanda Boetzkes, in The Ethics of Earth Art, asserts the view that earth artists 
attempt to form an ethical relation with the earth that is neither instrumental, nor 
naively Romantic in the sense that humans live in seamless continuity with it.  
These artists create works based on bodily receptivity to the elemental qualities 
of the world, rather than on representations that reduce the earth to purely 
human meanings.  In section III of my essay, I will explain how some of their 
methods rely on and utilize concepts such as elementals and ‘speaking matter’.   
Colonization 
 Colonization is the master’s attempt to naturalize a dualistic power 
structure in order to exert control over a place, a people, or a resource or object.  
Colonizers, according to Plumwood, utilize ‚*t+he rationalist ideology of reason‛ 
as a means of separating themselves from the colonized—radically excluding 
them—and devaluing their traits.  Once the dichotomy is established and a thing 
is categorized as other, the master has a logical structure through which it can 
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dominate (Plumwood 2002, 106).  While dualisms, reductionism, and viewing 
nature/culture as discontinuous are implicit attitudes that often lead to 
corresponding actions with negative ethical effects for ‘others’, groups engage in 
colonization in a more active and explicit way.    
 Most colonizers, like those in the Americas, utilize many methods, both 
subtle and brutal, to transcend indigenous populations and to justify taking their 
lands and subordinating them.  Greta Gaard, in her essay ‚Toward a Queer 
Ecofeminism,‛ notes that colonizers of the Americas assessed many fundamental 
aspects of indigenous life in relation to their own beliefs in order to place native 
practices in the lower sphere of animalistic nature (Gaard 2004, 37).  In fact, 
Gaard asserts that  
 ‚the rhetoric of Christian colonialism‛ allowed for a scenario in which 
 the Europeans filled the role of benevolent culture ‚civilizing‛ savage 
 nature—and this ‚civilizing‛ involved taking the natives’ homelands, 
 eliminating their cultural and spiritual practices, and raping and enslaving 
 their people.  
        (Gaard 2004, 34)  
For colonizers of the Americas, native sexuality and gender relations ultimately 
‚played a prominent role in the rhetoric and the justification of colonial 
conquest‛ (Gaard 2004, 35).   
 Expanding on Plumwood’s master model, Gaard explains how colonial 
nationalism, as a specific form of colonialism, is dependent upon the five 
elements of backgrounding, radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalism, 
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and homogenization within Plumwood’s master model (Gaard 2004, 37).  Gaard 
uses these points to highlight how myriad associations with nature, including 
sexuality, ‚are used to authorize colonization‛ (Gaard 2004, 37).   
 The process of colonization of land entails many steps, from developing a 
view of those to be colonized, through the actual appropriation of land. First, the 
colonizer categorizes a place as ‘unused’ nature.  In order to justify taking land 
from others by utilizing the ‘fundamental’ power of culture over nature, 
colonizers link indigenous groups to the land.  By correlating interdependence 
with and labor on the land to nature itself, domination of peoples, including 
taking their lands, is just another act in which the master elevates culture above 
nature.  Those who use land in a non-reductionist way are discounted along with 
nature (Shiva 1993, 32).  Once a dominant group distinguishes native lands as 
‚empty‛ and ‚valueless‛ nature, and the work done by indigenous groups as 
trivial within the master’s dualistic framework and ‚hierarchy of activities‛ 
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49), appropriation by the master appears to follow logically, 
if not justly as the colonizer might claim (Shiva 1993, 32). 
 The idea of putting land ‚to proper, rational use,‛ has existed as a part of 
the ‚liberal-capitalist property formation mythology of western colonization‛ for 
some time, and has roots in Locke’s formulation of autonomy (Plumwood 2002, 
21).  In this paradigm, the ‚rational labours of white European Heroes upon a 
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passive, captive virgin earth called ‘nature’‛ are the basis of property formation, 
a necessity of colonization (Plumwood 2002, 21).  This paradigm, Plumwood 
notes, currently conceptualizes colonized or marginalized groups as ‚losers.  .  .  
such as the first world unemployed or third world subsistence farmers‛ 
(Plumwood 2002, 21).  These groups are seen as part of ‘nature’, or at least 
representing the less than rational qualities within it (Plumwood 2002, 21).  Here, 
the view of discontinuity becomes useful for the colonizer, who dissociates from, 
and elevates himself above, the natural world.  
 While implicit structural components clearly affect the status and reality 
of the colonized, and of the ‚losers‛ within a dualistic system, those dominant 
within the structure do not view the system as faulty because it forms the reality 
from which they benefit.  Rather, they see those who do not succeed under, say, 
‚current market rules,‛ as being like the ‚rationally deficient‛ slaves ‚in classical 
times‛—inefficient and lacking sufficient rationality (Plumwood 2002, 21).   
 For example, Gaard quotes a Spanish decree that was read to the Kogi 
people in 1498 before their colonization—though not in a language 
comprehensible to them.  It details the domination they were about to endure 
under the Spanish, and ends with the statement:  ‘‚I declare that the deaths and 
harms which arise from this will be your fault, and not that of their highnesses, 
nor mine, nor of the gentlemen who have come with me here (Ereira 1992, 74)‛’ 
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(Gaard 2004, 34-35).  As this decree illustrates, responsibility for any ill-treatment 
is often placed on the colonized or subordinated.  A current example in which a 
dominant group instrumentalizes and backgrounds others for its ends and then 
blames the subordinate group for its marginalized position, comes from an issue 
playing out currently within U.S. culture.  It involves the prevalent dualistic 
stance toward working illegal immigrants.   
 These immigrants are labeled as a detrimental force to the welfare of 
unemployed American citizens by those asserting unquestioningly that the 
illegals have no right to work in the U.S.  Believing that employing these 
immigrants takes viable jobs away from Americans, their contribution is 
dismissed, though it is clear that often, they perform vital functions within 
society, like gathering produce.  Corporations instrumentalize them by paying 
them less than competitive wages, at a level that is often extremely unfair 
compensation for their work.  Furthermore, by profiting from their labor and 
contributions, corporations and the American population at large, background 
them by utilizing their efforts for their personal good, while at the same time 
denying its worth.   
 Most Americans assert that these immigrants are taking jobs that 
Americans should fill.  However, it appears that Americans reap benefits from 
immigrant labor without acknowledging its contributions, and, that furthermore, 
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they avoid performing tasks that immigrants do readily—like menial labor, and 
migrant farming.  For example, when laws against immigrants were strictly 
enforced in Alabama, and they fled from the threat of deportation, produce 
remained unharvested, abandoned to rot in the fields (‚The Price of Intolerance‛  
2011).  These examples reveal how nature and groups like the Kogi and working 
illegal immigrants deemed closer to it, are seen as external means to the master 
culture’s ‚significant‛ ends.   As these examples illustrate, those in the dominant 
position within dualisms come to include aspects of indigenous life, and culture, 
and to justify ‚collateral economic damage‛ to human groups associated with 
non-rational nature (Plumwood 2002, 21). 
 Teresa Brennan’s description of the ‚cultural mythology of male-coded 
reason mastering female-coded nature‛ as ‚a ‘sadodispassionate’ drama,‛ 
illustrates why intersubjective connections are ethically vital (Plumwood 2002, 
22).  In her striking interpretation, the hero of this drama uses the reason/emotion 
dualism, as well as the ‚associated ideals of detached rationality to deny or cut 
off empathy or identification with the Other‛ (Plumwood 2002, 22).   
 ‚The sadodispassionate is the doctor who experiments on his or her 
 fellow creatures, such as the disabled put to death in Nazi institutions.  He
 feels nothing when he should feel empathy, and we recognize this as a 
 grievous moral failing.‛  
       (Plumwood 2002, 22) 
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 Early in American history, Thomas More justified appropriation of land in 
a dispassionate manner.  He viewed commandeering it for the colonizers’ 
purposes as the enactment of the positive ideal of putting land to good use.  
However, for More, appropriate use of the land meant profitable use for the 
master, and he discounted all other uses, including those long established by 
indigenous populations.  The colonization of indigenous lands was the concrete 
outcome of this ideal (Shiva 1993, 32).  In contrast to this principle, Native 
American writers, Roberta J. Hill and Gloria Bird, discuss their own perceptions 
and experiences of colonization by the United States government.  In Hill’s essay, 
‚Immersed in Words,‛ she introduces the ‚Black Hawk War‛ as an example of 
the way that the U.S. government has used Native Americans as means to their 
ends throughout America’s history.   
 This war was a struggle for land in which colonizers discounted the 
vitality and existence of Indian ways of life, as well as cut short numerous Indian 
lives.  Hill uses the war to bridge her discussion of early American colonial acts 
with modern ways in which the government ‘has continuously worked to define 
and control its ‚Indian people‛’ (Hill 1998, 77).  Explaining how the reductive 
process of homogenization/stereotyping has denigrated the Native American 
people, Hill states that ‚*a+ll the beauty and diversity of our ways of life are 
lumped into a singular American-made, tourist-trade arti-fact‛ (Hill 1998, 77): 
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 [t]he colonizing historians created views about the history and values of 
 Indian peoples and their influence on American culture.  From their 
 perspective, Indian peoples and their cultures were curiosities, objects of 
 scorn, or obstructions to expansion.  
        (Hill 1998, 83)  
She suggests that the government meets Native resistance to political policies 
that appear to enforce modern forms of colonialism by amending bills ‚to swing 
the pendulum of oppression in a different arc‛ (Hill 1998, 77). For example, 
instead of the explicit appropriations of land, now, issues about how to classify 
Indians within groups related to heritage becomes essential to controlling them 
within the master model where homogenization and exclusion is a powerful 
mechanism.  Those outside of Native American culture make many of the 
determinations about Indian heritage not their own. Additionally, they foster an 
internal conflict and animosity between Indians who must include or exclude 
more tenuously connected members of their group who may have moved off 
Indian reservations or married non-Indians.      
 Gloria Bird’s essay, ‚Breaking the Silence:  Writing as ‚Witness,‛ further 
illuminates historical colonialism through the personal testimonial of Bird’s own 
experience with colonization of lands, as well as her life on reservations.  She 
states that ‚*a+ complex of strains on our communities exists as a result of 
colonization—the conversion to Christianity, for example‛ (Bird 1998, 31).  Bird 
claims that government, culture, and media continue to marginalize Indian 
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communities (Bird 1998, 29).  She asserts that this marginalization stems from 
colonization, and the likelihood that Native Americans ‘‛were never meant to 
survive‛’ (Bird 1998, 29).   
 What both authors note is that, within modern U.S. politics, the dualistic 
activities of colonization and appropriation take on new forms as time goes on.  
Instead of taking the lands to ‘put to good use’, Native American lands are now 
commonly used by the U.S. for dumping radioactive and toxic waste (Hill 1998, 
81;  Bird 1998, 27).  In fact, due to the disproportionate use of Native American 
lands for dumping, in 1994, the Clinton administration ‚redefined environmental 
hazards in low-income and minority communities as a civil rights issue‛ 
(Adamson 2001, 52).  Bird also states, echoing the sentiments of Gaard and 
Plumwood, that government agencies are ‚intent on colonizing the minds of the 
people‛ (Bird 1998, 27).  As I will elucidate in a later section, like Bird and Hill, 
many Native Americans utilize artistic practice as a means of fighting the 
colonization of Indian minds and land.  As Bird states,  
 .  .  .  being Indian in the United States is inherently political.  .  .  In light 
 of this, I see my personal story as bearing witness to colonization and my 
 writing as a testimony aimed at undoing those processes that attempt to 
 keep us in the grips of the colonizer’s mental bondage. 
           (Bird 1998, 29) 
Bird focuses on the personal aspects of Indian lives that colonization has affected, 
and continues to affect.  She believes in the importance of autobiography as the 
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practice of ‚witnessing,‛ in order to ‚identify those instances in which we have 
internalized what we are taught about ourselves‛ and to ‚rewrite our history.‛ 
(Bird 1998, 29-30).   
 Attempts to fight colonization, the way Bird and Hill do, involve what 
Elizabeth Deloughrey and George B. Handley call, ‚postcolonial poetics‛ 
(Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 29).  These practices reimagine relationships 
where fragmentation exists (Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 29).  ‚*W+ithout 
either idealizing fragmentation or yearning nostalgically for wholeness‛ these 
strategies avoid making identity ‚static or predetermined‛ ( Deloughrey and 
Handley 2011, 29).  Rather, identity is ‚created by the imagination’s virtual and 
cross-cultural journey across geographies and difference‛ (Deloughrey and 
Handley 2011, 29).  These methods of revision use experiential relationships with 
a place, often a specific geographic region that is a site of meaning for a group.  
Due to colonization and its effects, such as destroying a long-held relationship 
with a particular place, it is necessary for displaced groups to take active steps in 
developing their identity.  This helps them counteract some of the internalization 
of negative effects of the denigration stemming from domination and 
colonization.  Having been herded away from their way of life and/or land, they 
must find a new sense of identity of their own, and a new relationship to their 
land and its unfolding history.  
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The Feminist Move to Care Ethics 
 The study of power is a study of relationships.  Feminist philosophy sees 
relationships quite differently than do many strands of traditional Western 
philosophy.  Women’s historical social roles and unique biological status, 
including the ability to experience motherhood, inform the feminist perspective 
on relationships, and bring the idea of ‚care‛ assertively into the discussion.   
While many feminists possessing varying theoretical bases work to 
reconceptualize power as a ‚capacity or ability, specifically, the capacity to 
empower or transform oneself and others,‛ it is important to note that, for 
Foucault, the forces that constitute biopower are internalized, as well as partially 
produced by their subjects, though not straightforwardly and consciously (Allen 
2011, 26).  Therefore, one’s choices are contingent upon those forces to some 
extent.  Like some Native American authors’ interpretations of their lives as 
internalizing the attitudes of their colonizers, historical contingencies come 
implicitly to bear on one’s identity under the biopower conceptualization.  
Though the ethics of care can encompass many definitions of care, I find 
Peta Bowden’s assertion on ‘caring’ to be a helpful starting point within the 
discussion.  She states that caring  
‛expresses ethically significant ways in which we matter to each other, 
transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond ontological 
necessity or brute survival‛ (Bowden 1997, 1).  




This explanation of caring goes beyond the notion that caring is predominantly 
the labor, the utilitarian production of care, provided to someone in need (Held 
2004, 60).  It also implicitly advances the idea that the two major aspects of caring 
unite to form an ethically productive sense of care.  Both care, as the doing of the 
things needed to care for someone, and care, as the feeling of ‘‚caring about‛’ 
someone or something, are important to care ethics (Held 2004, 60).   
 These two elements form a continuity that relates the internalization of the 
feeling of caring about someone’s well-being to the actual act of caring for 
another, similar to the relation and intertwinement of reason/emotion, or 
sensibility/intelligibility.  As Held states, ‚*a+n important aspect of care is how it 
expresses our attitudes and relationships‛ (Held 2004, 61).  It is in this continuity 
between the attitudes of care and the actions of care that I see a parallel with 
ethics based on practice, particularly with engaged artistic practices in which the 
artist relates uniquely to the world, and expresses a concept intended for 
reception by another, an audience (even if that audience is the artist him/herself).  
Utilizing the mind and body together with an awareness of these intersubjective 
interactions is a basis for counteracting dualisms.  Similar to the unification of 
traits like mind and body, Sara Ruddick reveals how care ethics combines 
elements of labor and relationship, stating    
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 ‛as much as care is labor, it is also relationship .  .  .  caring labor is 
 intrinsically relational.  The work is constituted in and through the 
 relation of those who give and receive care.  .  .‛ (Ruddick 1998, 13-14).  
(Held 2004, 62)   
  
It is at the intersection of the mutually reinforcing actions of giving care and 
feeling care about something where ethical decisions are made, similar to the 
way ethical decisions are made within practice in practice-based ethics. 
 Furthermore, Nel Noddings focuses on the necessity of ‘‛engrossment‛’ 
with the other (Held 2004, 61 and 62).  This ‚engrossment‛ encompasses 
attentiveness ‚to the feelings, needs, desires, and thoughts of those cared for and 
a skill in understanding a situation from that person’s point of view‛ as being 
‚central to caring for someone‛ (Held 2004, 60).  While this approach creates a 
novel subject/object pair—the ‘carer’ and the ‘cared-for’—it does not appear to 
simply reverse the master/slave dualism.  Rather than either party being cast in 
the role of slave to the other, the relationships fostered by care ethics allow the 
subject and object to relate to each other in a manner that highlights their 
interdependence and is beneficial to them both.   
For instance, caring for the earth may appear to place the caring 
individual at the call of the environment.  However, due to the need of the 
human/subject for a healthy environment and the need of the nature/object to be 
treated in a life-sustaining manner, the subject and object share in the rewards of 
a mutually beneficial system.  Like this one, many examples of care relationships 
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focus on the actions/responsibilities of the individual deemed as the ‘carer’.  
These scenarios focus on descriptions and prescriptions of moral agents who 
represent those ethically capable to care for another.  However, the 
acknowledgement of interdependence inherent in the heart of care ethics 
suggests that the ethically ‘responsible’ parties are not merely subject to the 
demands of others, rather, they are involved in systems in which they benefit as 
well.  As Dewey asserted, life persists ‚through interaction with‛ the 
environment (Dewey 1934, 12), and at their core, many relationships seem to 
share this high level of symbiosis.  
Using Noddings’ perspective, the cognitive state of the one giving care 
appears to highlight differences explicated in Erin McCarthy’s explanation of 
intimacy and integrity based world orientations.  These orientations, which I 
explain more fully in the following section, reveal a set of dispositions toward 
others in the world.  Noddings asserts that the ‘carer’ is engaging in a 
‘‛receptive-intuitive‛’ understanding and empathy of the other’s needs, rather 
than an ‘‛objective-analytic‛’ one (Held 2004, 60).  
 One can only sustain the possibility of ‚a natural impulse to care for 
others,‛ however, by committing morally ‚to the ideal of caring,‛ according to 
Noddings (Held 2004, 60).  Sara Ruddick explains the way that care, ‚as a kind of 
labor rather than an already normative concept contrasted with justice‛ can 
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stimulate an ethics (Held, 64).  Ruddick’s explanation illustrates the more 
‚context-respectful approaches‛ of care ethics (Held 1998, 99) 
 ‛The ‚ethics‛ of care is provoked by the habits and challenges of the 
 work, makes sense of its aims, and spurs and reflects upon the self-
 understanding of workers.  The ethics also extends beyond the activities 
 from which it arises, generating a stance (or standpoint) toward ‚nature,‛ 
 human relationships, and social institutions.  .  .  .  First, memories of 
 caring and being cared for inspire a sense of obligation.  .  .  . [And] a 
 person normatively identifies with a conception of herself as someone 
 who enters into and values caring relationships, exercising particular 
 human capacities as well.  Neither memory nor identity ‚gives rise‛ to an 
 ‚ethics‛ that then leaves them behind.  Rather there is an interplay in 
 which each recreates the other‛ (Ruddick 1998, 20-21).  
(Held 2004, 64). 
 
Ruddick’s explanation acknowledges the personal, active habits of caring labor, 
in a way that appears similar to the notion of embodied practices because the 
work itself further develops the relationship between the carer and the cared-for.  
The artistic practices that I will illustrate engender and reinforce a more 
relational ethical stance toward others through similar mechanisms of 
engagement.  Furthermore, Ruddick’s view of caring work, and the self-
reflection and cultivation engendered by it, develop an ethical perspective in 
which care is generated by the carer’s engagement with the cared-for.  Artistic 
practice often functions as a process mirroring and expanding this type of self-
cultivating, engaged caring. 
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Theory and Practice:  Knowing-how versus Knowing-that 
Strengthening the ethics of care, where to begin:  rules, virtuous traits, 
or embodied action? 
‚The object of our enquiry is not to know what virtue is but how to    
  become good, and that is the sole benefit of it.‛  
       Aristotle (Shaw in Hull 2005, 65) 
 
 The differences between various ethical approaches often involve the 
distinctions between the components of theory, practice, and application.  A 
predominant difference between these approaches, I assert, stems from how they 
combine within the context of actually ‘being’ in the real-world.  Each theoretical 
approach shapes decisions in differing, though not thoroughly oppositional 
methods.  Most Western philosophy separates out the components of modes of 
doing.  For instance, theory is often separated from practice, or, as Maraldo 
states, from action.    
This model perceives ‚practice as divided from a goal that is the point of 
an activity or action, the real reason for doing something‛ (Maraldo 2009, 8-9).  
This division locates practice in the sphere of mere means, while theory 
represents the end provided through practice.  If not for the goal of theory, then, 
practice would be obsolete.  Within this type of dualist paradigm, the goal of 
reaching an ‘ideal’ devalues practice in favor of theory.  This paradigm is rooted 
in the ancient philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.  Theory, as an abstract function 
of reason, could be associated with Plato’s idealized forms, seen as determinant 
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and oriented toward maleness and culture (Held, 93).  Practice, on the other 
hand, due to its engagement with the actual physical world, resembles Aristotle’s 
view of matter as associated with femaleness and indefiniteness.  Matter was, 
thus, considered closer to nature and further from morality—a view that became 
entrenched in much Western philosophical/ethical thought (Held, 93).  
 Theories, as used within this system, it follows, are the abstract 
propositions, separate from real-life experience that generally form the 
foundation, the starting point, for ethical action within much of Western 
philosophy (Maraldo 2009, 9).  In various Eastern systems, however, practice, 
while also allowing for progression toward a more ideal state of awareness, is 
itself both a path, and a state of enlightenment (Carter 2008, 5).  Related to the 
theory/practice difference, the concept of application forms another nuance 
within ethical systems.  However, while both are, in some sense, action-oriented, 
clear-cut and important differences exist between practice and application 
(Maraldo 2009, 9).   
 Practice, within ‚East-Asian philosophical traditions‛ can be considered 
‚knowing by way of practice,‛ while application of a principle or theory entails 
possessing a precise enough grasp, or knowledge, of its scheme in order to apply 
it to a given situation (Maraldo 2009, 9 my emphasis).  I assert that one of the 
major distinctions between rule-based, virtue-based, and practice-based ethics is 
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the different emphasis and sequencing of the process for coming to ethical 
decisions within these systems.   
 Imagine a continuum with the category of rules at one end, engaged 
actions at the other, and virtuous traits somewhere in between and extending 
toward both ends.  Within Western deontological ethical systems, the rule end of 
the continuum is the starting point for the process of ethical action.  Once the rule 
is decided upon, learned, and independently ‚discursively examine*d+,‛ it can be 
applied to a given situation (Maraldo 2009, 10-11).  At the time of its application, 
it does not entail seeking out authentic ethical truth in the sense of discovery or 
‚indication‛ (Maraldo 2009, 10), but merely creation of correspondence between 
a given action and a given structure/rule that has already been logically analyzed 
and decided upon outside of the phenomenological experience to which it 
relates.  In such a system, therefore, the analysis of the rule is done through 
thought coming before, and separated from action.  Consequently, it is largely 
unresponsive to the intuitions occurring alongside the action within the specific 
contexts—as they may differ from mere application of the rule. 
 The next step on the continuum comprises virtue ethics, which 
emphasizes deeply ingrained dispositions of goodness—traits that inspire right 
action within the procedure of ethical decision-making (Hursthouse 2010).  
Virtuous traits and the ethical acts of those who possess them, fulfill various 
53 
 
functions, one of which is the standardization or normalization of rules codifying 
the acts of those possessing virtue.  Application, then, within virtue ethics, could 
be characterized as the act of emulating the virtuous.  This undertaking ‚is not 
the sort of thing that can be grasped by a general definition that is subsequently 
applied,‛ however (Maraldo 2009, 12).  For Maraldo, therefore, Aristotelian type 
virtue ethics calls for a virtue to be ‚tested by actions, by repeated actions that let 
one .  .  .  perform it excellently, almost by second nature,‛ in order to internalize 
and to fully understand it. (Maraldo 2009, 12).   
 Maraldo sees Aristotelian virtue ethics as containing the seeds of practice 
as he understands it to exist within Japanese philosophy (Maraldo 2009, 13).  
Furthermore, he distinguishes between types of practice by utilizing the Greek 
distinction of praxis and poiesis.   Maraldo indicates that Aristotle, in contrast to 
Plato, saw praxis as a type of practice ‚that does not result in a product (ergon) 
separate from the activity,‛ as does the production of theory as the end goal of 
practice seen in many ethical systems (as poeisis). (Maraldo 2009, 14).   
 Aristotle’s system, however, did require that both types of practice be 
‚based on a theoretical account, a logos, that is separate from the doing or the 
making and that informs and guides them‛ (Maraldo 2009, 14).  The locus of 
ethical decision-making within Aristotelian virtue ethics, therefore, still 
maintains some distance between the agent and the object, —that which is 
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affected by his or her actions—because the decision is made before and separated 
from those who are affected by it. 
 Practice, as bodily engagement, however, encompasses a stronger sense of 
being intuitively compelled to perform a specific ethical behavior.  This entails 
more than merely ‘choosing’ one, since it emanates from the intersubjective 
engagement between an agent and the objects inspiring ethical concern.  In this 
paradigm, the concern, the ethical stance, is discovered and/or formed through 
the engaged interaction itself, and like care ethics, it encompasses a ‚context-
respectful approach‛ (Held, 99).  Regarding embodied engagement, John Russon 
states, ‚[o]ur bodies are the living processes by which we establish contact with 
reality‛ (Russon 2003, 21).  They are ‚the point where each of us is something 
specific,‛ where we develop the structures of ‚being open to being hurt and 
being open to the pursuit of pleasure,‛ the ‚structures of embodiment‛ (Russon 
2003, 21).  Being a body, Russon asserts, is the way to form engagements and 
empathy with other entities (Russon 2003, 21).   
 Dewey fleshes out this idea of bodily engagement with other entities by 
emphasizing that generally, in relationships, entities form reciprocal interactions.  
This suggests to Dewey, that nothing attained by the human, by ‚the highest 
flight of thought  .  .  .  or penetrated by any probing insight is inherently such 
that it may not become the heart and core of sense.‛  I interpret this statement to 
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mean that any ideal element can find deeper articulation of expression in 
embodied form, or at least a fundamental connection to it (Dewey 1934, 30).  
Advancing these concepts of embodiment into the ethical realm, Erin McCarthy 
states in her essay, Towards a Transnational Ethics of Care, 
 When the relational aspect of self-hood is foregrounded, when being in 
 relation is recognized as an integral part of what it is to be a human-being-
 in-the-world, then we are one step further on our way toward an ethics of 
 care.  
(McCarthy 2008, 113) 
 Utilizing Thomas Kasulis’ 2002 book, Intimacy or Integrity:  Philosophy and 
Cultural Difference, McCarthy highlights two world orientations, ‚intimacy 
oriented and integrity oriented‛ (McCarthy 2008, 114).  Though there are no 
cultures possessing these orientations in a radical form, Western philosophy’s 
predominant perspectives on ‚selfhood and identity,‛ as well as its 
categorization of ‚an ethics of justice‛ follow the integrity orientation.  The 
characteristics of this orientation are: 
1. Public verifiability of objectivity. 
2. Emphasis on external, rather than internal relations. 
3. Lack of affect within knowledge. 
4. Division of the ‚intellectual and psychological‛ from the somatic, or      
bodily. 
5. Self-consciousness of and reflection on the grounds of knowledge. 
      (McCarthy 2008, 114) 
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 Contrasting this Western, integrity-oriented model, is the intimacy-
oriented paradigm, which includes certain values corresponding to elements of 
Asian philosophy (McCarthy 2008, 114).  Within this orientation: 
1. Intimacy is ‚personal rather than public,‛ though also considered 
objective. 
2. The line between oneself and the other within an intimate relationship 
typically is blurred. 
3. Knowledge that is ‚intimate‛ demonstrates elements of affect. 
4. ‚Intimacy is somatic as well as psychological.‛ 
5. The foundation of intimacy lacks the ‚self-conscious, reflective, or self-
illuminating‛ qualities of knowledge within an integrity-oriented 
culture. 
       (McCarthy 2008, 114). 
 
 While both orientations have value, in certain philosophies embracing the 
intimacy orientation, positive traits that foster intersubjective relations and 
continuity with emotional and natural elements of life predominate.  For 
instance, rather than testing criteria for right action, according to Carter, Japanese 
philosophy focuses on the ‚development of character and of the whole person‛ 
and integrates ethics into daily life and artistic practices as well (Carter 2008, 5).  
In Carter’s chapter on the ‚Way of Pottery,‛ he states that Zen Buddhism fosters 
the idea that, though the world functions dualistically, one ‚can be free of the 
constraints of duality‛ (Carter 2008, 120).  The ideal of functioning non-
dualistically, Carter asserts, is cultivated by becoming aware of ‚one’s own 
nature,‛ in which one finds ‚the undifferentiated, the unborn, nothingness‛ by 
letting go of one’s ego (Carter 2008, 121). 
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 By ‚breaking.  .  .  the chains of ordinary seeing‛ and living a ‚lifetime of 
renewal and dedication‛ to one’s artistic practice, the ‚line between oneself and 
the other,‛ as McCarthy stated regarding the intimacy-orientation, ‚is blurred‛ 
(McCarthy 2008, 114).  Furthermore, as Carter explains regarding the ‚Way of 
Tea,‛ on the relationship of the self to the other, ‚the goal is to eliminate the gap 
completely‛ (Carter 2008, 94).  The practice of the Tea Ceremony is meant to 
remove all boundaries between a host and a guest, the self and the ritual act;  
ideally, these pairs of elements should become unified (Carter 2008, 94).  The 
desired effect of closing the gap is elevation of participants to ‚a higher state of 
awareness, a higher level of kindness and appreciation.  .  . where the idea of 
rank is jettisoned altogether‛ (Carter 2008, 94).  This striving for ‚no distinction 
between self and other,‛ is a total absorption ‚in that which is to be known, to be 
loved‛ (Carter 2008, 130).  Regarding this level of engagement, Nishida states: 
 ‚We forget the self, and at this point an incomprehensible power beyond 
 the self functions alone in all of its majesty;  there is neither subject nor 
 object, but only the true union of subject and object‛ (Nishida 1990, 174-
 75).  
(Carter 2008, 130)   
    
 Additionally, ethics within Japanese culture perceives Enlightenment as 
encompassed within practice itself, and ethics itself as a sense of ‚living as fully 
as possible with others and in nature‛ (Carter 2008, 5).  Though Asian traditions 
sometimes make conceptual distinctions between mind and body, Carter asserts 
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that no ontological distinction exists (Carter 2008, 9).  In fact, the Japanese word, 
kokoro, encompasses the idea of mind/heart, and ‚the showing of human-
heartedness without an ulterior motive‛ (Carter 2008, 149).  Thus, several 
dualisms that affect Western philosophy are absent in some of these traditions, 
like mind/body, reason/emotion, thought/action.   
Since the mutual exclusivity of the mind and body is nonexistent, other 
attitudes that play off of this dualism hold less power.  For instance, the Japanese 
tradition opposes much Western integrity-oriented thought, in which dominant 
perspectives hierarchize and categorize sets of objects dualistically.  In these 
dualistic relations, those seen as possessing more human rationality are ranked 
above those seen to possess less.  Since Japanese philosophy and culture sees 
mind/heart as united, distinguishing those others, like elements of nature, that 
appear to lack rational thought/mind is not a strong basis for denigrating them.     
 In her book, Boundaries, American architect and sculptor, Maya Lin 
introduces several examples through her art and architecture, of what appear to 
be a marriage of intimacy and integrity-based world orientations.  The influence 
of the life and aesthetics of her father, a Japanese potter living in America, 
heavily influenced Lin’s artistic perspective.  Living in a home ‚in the city, yet 
separate from it, always surrounded by the natural environment,‛ her father 
worked with clay ‚effortlessly as a fluid, plastic medium,‛ interacting with it, 
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kneading and shaping it for hours (Lin 2000, 7:03).  Lin says that later, she 
realized that her works were often generated ‚from a completely organic, hand-
shaped method‛ influenced by her long held ‚affinity.  .  .  toward sculpting the 
earth‛ (Lin 2000, 7:03).   
 In contrast, at Yale University, Lin learned the formal elements of 
architecture and sculpture, through what can be seen as a more integrity-
oriented approach—with objective, formal external relations and motivations as 
likely bases for making aesthetic decisions.  Her unique sensibilities, however, 
imbue the elements of the formal academic approach within her method and 
artwork with a sense of the intimacy world orientation.  For example, Lin 
describes her architectural works as utilizing the concepts of ‚paths,‛ ‚light,‛ 
and ‚asymmetry‛ in ways that seem to map onto an intimacy based orientation 
(Lin 2000, 10:04).  Working with ‚paths‛ to create ‚spaces that flow, freely, 
seamlessly,‛ Lin ‚thinks in terms of interfaces, how people live in and move 
through the space, how they feel it, not how they interpret it‛ (Lin, 10:04). In this 
way, she creates a clearly intimacy based approach in which, not only affective 
responses are important, but intimacy, as explained by McCarthy, is both 
psychological and somatic as well (Lin 2000, 10:04).    
 Lin states that each work she creates ‚originates from a simple desire to 
make people aware of their surroundings, not just the physical world but also 
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the psychological world we live in,‛ a concept that mirrors the intimacy-oriented 
view that mind and body cannot be ontologically separated (Lin 2000, 2:03).  
Though attracted to ‚presenting factual information‛ through her work, her 
ultimate concern is for creating ‚places in which to think, without trying to 
dictate what to think‛ (Lin 2000, 2:03).  Additionally, regardless of a work’s 
motivation, whether inspired by social ideas or, alternatively, by ‚purely 
aesthetic levels of experience,‛ she attempts to make artistic choices that ‚create 
an intimate dialogue with the viewer,‛ in which the viewer actively participates 
with the work (Lin 2000, 2:03).  For example, the scale of the typeface that Lin 
chose to be chiseled into the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was a contentious 
issue.  Smaller than one half of an inch, it is ‚unheard of in monument type 
sizing‛ (Lin 2000, 4:14).  ‚What it does is create a very intimate reading in a very 
public space, the difference in intimacy between reading a billboard and reading 
a book‛ (Lin 2000, 4:14).     
 Like the intimacy-oriented approach, in which the involvement that is 
intimacy, includes objective elements, while being ‚personal rather than public,‛ 
Lin hopes to create private conversations with each viewer, ‚no matter how 
public each work is and no matter how many people are present‛ (Lin 2000, 
2:03).  The works have a tactile quality.  ‚This active participation.  .  .  involves 
the viewer in a direct and intimate dialogue with the work‛ (Lin 2000, 2:03).  Lin 
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realized that she was successful in creating intimacy in her design of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial when she first visited it after completion.  She states, ‚I found 
myself searching out the name of a friend’s father and touching it.  It was strange 
to realize that I was another visitor and I was reacting to it as I had designed it‛ 
(Lin 2000, 4:17).     
III.  The Contribution of Embodied Artistic Practices 
‚Creativity and thus art, by its nature, is celebrative and calls for a loving 
consciousness.  Creativity, I would argue, always manifests concern;  and thus by 
its very nature, art is a celebration of personhood and world.‛  
(Deutsch 1996, 86-87, my emphasis). 
 Fingers infusing color into paper.  Hand and ear interacting, discovering 
harmony on strings.  The writer bonding words and ideas into novel 
combinations.  Learning to truly perceive and sense the world’s subtle nuances 
through its physical elements.  How can acts such as these enhance an ethical 
system?  Creating visual art, music, and written works—especially poetry and 
prose—are examples of what, at the most authentic level, is pure creative artistic 
production.  These processes, however, are more than means to ends.  By 
utilizing embodied practices as unique mechanisms whose components have 
ethical implications, artistic practices represent a dynamic method for vitalizing 
the richness and intersubjectivity of the ethics of care.   
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 These practices foster a holistic engagement with others through 
experiential interaction with physical materials, elementals, ideas and subject 
matter.  By meeting these substances at the threshold of one’s interaction with 
the world—as Russon dubs it, in one’s body, one becomes receptive to them in a 
richer sense that encompasses somatic, affective, and responsive elements of the 
mind/heart.  Within these practices, one learns to deal with other varied 
substances and entities in an ‚engrossed,‛ face-to-face engagement, and begins 
to understand their natures.  As in care ethics, this attentiveness to the situation 
and the context, including to materials, to feelings, to thoughts, and to other 
elements of existence, fosters a sense of empathy that is necessary for acting in an 
authentically caring manner toward another.  Through these refined attunements 
to others, these methods can cultivate a more empathic, and mutually beneficial 
relationship with the environmental other. 
 Along with these artistic practices, many elements, such as knowledge of 
the mechanisms of social structures that promote alienating and instrumental 
reasoning, understanding of the way that these structures affect others, as well as 
identification of whom they affect are important to the cultivation of a mature 
and encompassing ethical approach.  However, by fostering a more holistic and 
encompassing sense of awareness, engaging embodied artistic practices facilitate 
changes in ethical practices and relationships.  
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  Through contact/engagement with materials, ideas, and objects, one is 
stimulated into actions that open one up to inter-relational awareness and the re-
evaluation of one’s perception of the relationship of self to other.  Though I 
utilize examples of artists who have already metamorphosed extensively 
through such practices, I believe that a non-artist can be drawn to these types of 
practices, and experience these changes in attunement over time.  Similar to the 
way that education refines ones intellect through a process of conscious and 
unconscious learning through years of habitual practices, over time, artistic 
practices utilizing intense interaction and care for materials and ideas can 
enhance one’s view of the ‘other’ and one’s empathic and ethical attitude toward 
it.          
 As Eliot Deutsch states in the Chapter, ‚Aesthetic Experience and the 
Artwork,‛ in Essays on the Nature of Art,  
 the experience of an artwork (which is aesthetically forceful, meaningful, 
 and beautiful) involves.  .  .  assimilation, recognition, and discernment and 
 calls for a special appropriation that yields an integrated wholeness.   
        (Deutsch 1996, 31)  
This explanation, representative of the perspective of the viewer of art, describes 
a mode of incorporating and accepting a work of art ‚into our emotional texture‛ 
as, what he calls, ‚a kind of empathetic embrace‛ (Deutsch 1996, 31).  In this 
positive sense, incorporation involves the mind/heart in a holistic process of 
engaging with an artwork intellectually, emotionally, viscerally, and possibly 
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even physically or tactically.   Though appearing to emphasize the viewer, 
Deutsch’s explanation includes both the process of creating, as well as the 
process of reception, of the work.  For example, Deutsch explains ‘assimilation’ 
as an influence that awakens ‚feeling to what is presented by the artwork‛ 
similar to the way that the artist’s ‚power and rhythm of being‛ influenced the 
work itself (Deutsch 1996, 31).  Thus, Deutsch’s concept establishes the idea that 
art is part of a multifaceted process of transformation in which an artist 
transforms materials, the process of creation transforms the artist, and the work 
transforms the viewer.    
 By explaining some theoretical bases and providing examples of artists 
and artistic movements, in what follows, I will attempt to explain embodied 
artistic practices more thoroughly.  These examples reveal how these practices 
and processes can form lifelong paths, or ‚Ways,‛ that engender four levels of 
positive ethical effects.   Through an explanation of the way embodied artistic 
processes flow as ‚pure experience‛ through the artist out toward another 
individual, and then to a group of others, I attempt to clarify fundamental ethical 
elements of artistic practices.  Understanding how these processes affect 
individuals and groups helps show how they engender empathy, or care, in 
intersubjective relations.   
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 First, I will show specifically how artistic practices encompass several 
unique ways of relating to the world.  I argue that the visual artist, the musician, 
and the writer, first must ‚see‛ the world in a distinctively ‘open’ way, they must 
be attentive.  Through philosophical concepts and concrete examples, I tie this 
notion of attentiveness to perspectives on relating ethically that I believe can be 
applied to interactions with, often objectified, ‘others’, including elements of the 
natural environment.  Within this formulation, I develop a model in which 
attentiveness produced through artistic engagement exists as a relevant means of 
counteracting those traits and practices – inattentiveness in the form of dualisms, 
reductionism, viewing nature/culture as discontinuous, and colonization – that 
negatively impact the environment and people’s place within it.   
 Within the second level of effects, I develop the assertion that the act of 
genuine ‘seeing’ developed early in the flow of habitual artistic processes is a 
fundamental experiential practice in artistic engagement.  This practice leads the 
artist to engage actively with a subject and an idea in more authentic, embodied, 
physically based ways (or to highlight an absence of embodied engagement, as is 
often done in art utilizing intangible elementals).  This highly engaged 
exploration implicates both the artist’s choice of materials and of subject matter, 
and forms the basis of subsequent unique practices utilized in the arts.  Within 
these practices, unforeseen relationships, springing from creative 
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imagination/artistic intuition, and unification of conscious and unconscious 
elements, support radical juxtaposition and defamiliarization of everyday 
perceptions. Additionally, free play with materials, ideas, and subjects of 
artworks, creates a mindfulness leading to a more genuine sense of care for 
‘others’ of various types through visceral, emotional, and intellectual relations 
and interrelations that evade everyday unquestioned habits and norms.   
 The third level occurs as those external to the artist, the audience, respond 
to the process.  An individual relating to the works produced, be they written, 
musical, or visual, may discover ideas, newly linked in his/her mind, through 
various types of experiences or combinations of experiences with the works, be 
they affective, intellectual, visceral, or even tactile, like the intimate touch 
inspired by the small typeface gracing the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.   
 As the artist establishes a habitual way of opening up to the possibilities 
presented by materials and ideas, and the regular viewer establishes a habit of 
‚seeing‛ as a distinct practice of refining his or her awareness, space opens up 
for a more nuanced, holistic attunement to ‘others.’  These practices form what 
Asian cultures, such as Japanese, especially those practicing elements of Zen 
Buddhism, might call ‚Ways‛ (Carter 2008, 75).  A ‚Way‛ delineates ‚disciplines 
and techniques‛ taught within specific practices, such as the ‚Way of Tea,‛ or 
‚The Way of Pottery‛ (Carter 2008, 75).  Additionally, an individual practicing 
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the habits utilized in a ‚Way‛ is meant to extrapolate them throughout the 
spheres of his or her life.  Finally, these habits ‚become internalized as 
spontaneous reactions to the varied happenings of everyday life,‛ similar to 
Maraldo’s understanding of Aristotelian virtue ethics (Carter 2008, 75).   
 Through the habitual, engaged, bodily experiences of bodymind 
coordination engendered by the ‚Ways,‛ new relationships to people, animals, 
and things develop.   This fourth level of ethics, stemming from habitual artistic 
engagement, has influenced social movements, such as the Civil Rights 
Movement, which relied heavily on the power of folk music.   These movements 
express various humanitarian concerns and forms of activism involving empathy 
and care.   
Ethics through the Development of Embodied Artistic Habits, Traits, and 
Practices:  Artist and Viewer 
‚*L+earning to be kind is not just the intellectual recognition of what kindness is, 
but through mind and body as unified, one actually practices being kind.‛ 
(Carter 2008, 90). 
 As Carter states, ‚*a+ major part of ethics is being able to recognize the 
value and worth of another‛ (Carter 2008, 38).  In order to build new, more 
caring ethical relationships that realize value in another, one must become open 
to the possibility of new all-embracing relationships in which one meets others 
‚at an intrinsic level‛ where the other is a ‚thou‛ (Carter 2008, 94).  This 
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approach, of relating to another on a basic, phenomenological level, follows the 
intimacy world orientation and the contextual engagement of care ethics since 
one’s personal interaction and response to the other takes precedence over 
external, abstract perspectives of it.  That is, the somatic, affective, and 
psychological elements present when one is engaging with another, inform one’s 
stance toward it.  This type of perception and recognition of the other’s worth, 
therefore, contrasts with the integrity world orientation, as well as Kant’s 
formulation of respect, in which respect is formal and abstract, and framed as a 
generalized respect for rational humanity.  Toward the goal of discovering a new 
type of ethical intersubjectivity that Carter’s ideas support, I explore Kelly 
Oliver’s essay on Luce Irigary, ‚Vision, Recognition, and a Passion for the 
Elements.‛  
 Oliver’s essay introduces Irigaray’s ethical ideas regarding the 
irreducibility of subjects and objects (to each other) within relationships and in 
communication.  In attempting to synthesize some of Irigaray’s thoughts, Oliver 
states, ‚[c]ommunication does not demand subordination or assimilation.  It 
does not require a master-slave relationship,‛ rather the ability to form social 
relationships comes from recognizing the self’s limits (Oliver 2007, 131).  Here, 
limits hold no negative connotation, but rather, form the delineation between 
separate entities.  This distinction allows one to appreciate another through more 
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caring ethical relationships that foster a fuller awareness and acceptance of 
another’s differences, without dualistically homogenizing, instrumentalizing, or 
radically excluding another.   
 In The Ethics of Earth Art, Amanda Boetzkes describes Irigaray’s ethics of 
alterity regarding the interaction between self and others through a discussion of 
elementals.  Elementals include such substances as light, air, and sky, and 
distinguish themselves from things because, though one may still experience 
them through the senses, on some level they remain boundless and 
uncontainable (Boetzkes 2010, 102).  Furthermore, elementals exceed or engulf 
one’s field of perception because though they are sensed—touched, seen, etc.—
they remain ultimately intangible, and therefore, in a fundamental way, 
withdrawn from the senses (Boetzkes 2010, 102).   
 Because of these ephemeral qualities of elementals, Irigaray 
conceptualizes the category of ‚the elemental as the medium of alterity,‛ and 
Boetzkes asserts that elementals within this model, expose, as well as ‚disrupt 
embodied perception‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109,107).  Earth art that utilizes 
elementals, therefore, destabilizes the way in which one confronts a particular 
artistic expression, or environment (Boetzkes 2010, 142).  The subject becomes 
‚receptive to a manifestation of elemental phenomena.‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 142).  
That is to say, elementals foster a different view of the world through one’s 
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perception of their physical qualities (Boetzkes 2010, 142).  Through the 
apprehension of the nuances that they add to existence, like color, shape, and 
texture, the ‚solipsistic‛ view of the world is replaced by a less controlling and 
instrumentalizing perception of and attitude toward the earth (Boetzkes 2010, 
142).    
 Due to their particular unbounded qualities, elementals inspire a critical 
move within the subject for relating ethically to the other, the gesture of 
‚acknowledging the excess of the other and of the world‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 107).  
Awareness of elementals, therefore, sets up a sense of the limits between self and 
other, or self and world.  These limits are the basis of utilizing a mode of 
retraction as an ethical act (Boetzkes 2010, 107).  Retraction is the subject’s act of 
separating itself from others, and world.  This ‚retracted mode of being‛ is a 
basis for an ‚opening of the senses‛ because for one operating within this mode, 
elementals provide the means for the subject to distance itself from the other and 
see the other in a less self-interested manner.  Thus, elementals function as a 
meeting point between self and other (Boetzkes 2010, 106, 109).    
 This point where subject meets object constitutes Irigaray’s ‚partition of 
difference,‛ and, according to her, recognizing it precludes one from obscuring 
the expression of an other, expression being the manifestation of another’s way 
of being, including its ways of communicating and its differences from the 
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subject.  Though this model emphasizes distance and difference, in Irigaray’s 
formulation they exist in a sense that is distinct from the negative incarnations of 
distance and difference used in subordinating dualisms.  Rather, they function to 
help one avoid incorporating and instrumentalizing the other by respecting the 
other’s difference.  The subject’s act of pulling back within itself helps to form the 
partition, or ‘‚screen of resting before and after seeing.  .  .  a punctuation in 
which the eyes reconstitute for themselves the frame, the screen, the horizon of 
vision‛(Irigaray 1984, 161) ’ (Boetzes 2010, 109).       
 Regarding this partition as a realization of the threshold where the subject 
meets the world, I return to Russon’s conception of mood.  Utilizing his 
formulation, one’s way of relating to the world through mood is always colored 
by being in a mood.  Irigaray’s proposal of the need for distance from the other, 
developed through the use of elementals, is based on an idea similar to Russon’s 
conception of the difficulty of apprehending one’s mood while continually 
remaining situated within it.  Because one perceives and relates to the world, and 
to mood, from within them, Irigaray’s screen emphasizes the necessity of 
considering this juxtaposition of self to world.  Without recognition of this 
relation, the subject does not open to the other’s, or to the world’s unique way of 
being and risks incorporating its essence from an outside perspective, or utilizing 
it in a negatively dualistic manner.   
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 The idea of the screen suggests that, if one creates distance between itself 
as subject and other, this distance will provide the space necessary for the other 
to express its distinctive qualities and to speak for itself.  This space also allows 
the subject to be open and to hear what the other manifests and communicates in 
its own unique mode.  Following this distancing, this retraction, it is then 
possible to ‚gather back‛ a more genuine perception of the other in order to form 
an authentic intimate and communicative relationship with it on more mutually 
beneficial terms (Boetzkes 2010, 108).       
 Additionally, Irigaray’s concept of the partition brings forth ‚a sense of 
alterity‛ that is expressed through the approach to material form, especially 
through elementals, utilized in some contemporary art (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  
These contemporary genres, Boetzkes states, bring forth the use of retraction 
within perception, as well as radicalize the senses.  These modes of discernment, 
she asserts, provide a specific type of non-instrumental ethical relationship that 
can be formed with the earth by developing an aesthetic based on the use of 
elementals (Boetzkes 2010, 109).   
 For instance, in Dennis Oppenheim’s earth art performance, ‚Reading 
Position for Second Degree Burn,‛ the use of elementals created a relationship 
between artist and earth, one which the viewer could take part in through its 
photo documentation.  By lying in the sun with an opened book covering part of 
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his skin, the sunlight burned all but a white square where the book had been 
(Boetzkes 2010, 50).  Through this artistic performance, Oppenheim located his 
body at the threshold between the elements of light and earth, using its passive 
receptivity to create the art and the relationship between himself and the earth 
(Boetzkes 2010, 50).  Though Oppenheim sensed the elemental of light through 
the heat against his skin, it nonetheless remained intangible to him and to later 
viewers.  Furthermore, by utilizing the passive play of elementals on his body, 
rather than actively forming an art object, Oppenheim discovered an openness of 
sense engendered by his bodily contact with the elementals (Boetzkes 2010, 50).    
 Some earth art, as well as some of Maya Lin’s works, with their use of 
light, feeling, and touch, open art’s ‚boundaries to the infinite horizon of the 
earth and other elementals‛ that meet one at the bodily threshold of existence 
(Boetzkes 2010, 110).  Through artworks of this type, which draw upon the 
elemental, the nature/culture dualism is undermined.  This genre undercuts this 
type of dualism because rather than working with the elementals to dominate 
them and to create human cultural products that are distant from nature, earth 
artists allow the function of elementals to speak through their works as 
substances that escape reducibility to human signification.   In this way, ‚the 
elemental is the condition for the freedom of thinking that allows a sense of the 
other‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 110). Because one is unable to exceed the limit of the 
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elemental, the individual encounters the other ‚face-to-face‛ in the sense that the 
relationship between subject and object comes through responsiveness to and 
awareness of ‚the other’s difference.‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 148-49).  This ‘face-to-face’ 
type of encounter forms the basis of ‚ethical acknowledgment‛ because it avoids 
reducing the other within a representational form (Boetzkes 2010, 149 and 148).   
 Boetzkes believes that if one is considering the way in which art ‚forges a 
contact with the alterity of the earth,‛ it is important to understand the  
relationship between art and the sublime (Boetzkes 2010, 110).  The sublime is 
that quality that inspires wonder and intense emotion through its overpowering 
and incalculable nature.  For Kant, it constituted a particular type of experience, 
encompassing pain and pleasure engendered by the threshold where limitless 
reason and ‚the limits of the imagination‛ converged (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  
Somewhat related to Kant’s formulation, Irigaray’s view of the sublime comes 
from the sense of wonder emerging from the partition between the self and the 
other (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  Elementals give a sense of this limit by separating the 
self from the other, which cannot be subsumed, or in Plumwood’s terms, cannot 
be incorporated.   
 It is at the juncture of the ‚dramatic overflow of sense‛ where the other 
cannot be grasped that the sublime occurs.  Here, thought liberates itself from 
representation (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  These components of sense and elementals, 
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as ‚dimensions of the other as sublime,‛ furthermore, continue to undermine the 
dualism ‚between sensibility and intelligibility‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  They 
undercut dualisms because one cannot reduce the personal (or artistic) 
experience of them to pure thought or to pure sense perception.  Creating a 
discourse between the subject and the material and irreducible nuances of the 
other, including the earth, elementals help an individual locate the sublime at the 
point where one senses and experiences ‚the sensation of the fading of the 
sensible‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109).  Thus, like Japanese philosophy’s awareness of the 
‘background’, as that from which form emanates, the irreducible elementals 
create a means for viewing the earth with a sense of awe.    
 Irigaray’s view of self and other emphasizes the delineation between the 
two that the integrity world orientation supports.  Within both, there is a clear 
distinction between self and other, unlike the intimacy orientation’s blurring of 
them.  However, while her approach supports the importance of fully 
acknowledging difference, hers is an ethically aware view of difference that 
avoids the subordinating elements inherent in negative dualisms.  In one sense, 
then, her approach opposes much of Asian philosophy in which the ‘gap’ 
between self and other ideally is closed within a sense of continuity.  This 
continuity is expressed through the Japanese approach that inspires a subject to 
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strive toward total absorption with the object, the ultimate goal being the unified 
existence of subject and object.   
In contrast, Irigaray asserts that the distance between subject and object, 
and the elementals that form the threshold between them by allowing them to be 
sensed, are the bases of a positive ethical stance.  As Boetzkes states, ‚the only 
way to support this otherness and forge a path of communicability and intimacy 
is via the subject’s separation and gathering back‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 108).  Both 
Irigaray’s approach to the relationship between the subject and object and that of 
Japanese philosophy,  however, utilize intense engrossment with the expression 
of the other, and ultimately advance the same goal, that of awareness and 
acceptance of the other in a more sophisticated intersubjective ethical 
relationship.         
 Oliver further states that Irigaray calls on the ‚insistence of material 
elements, especially air‛ as a way of redefining relationships that are dependent 
on other elements, sometimes unseen ones (Boetzkes 2010, 126).  The alienation 
‘from the earth or others by an abyss is the product of what Irigaray calls the 
’‛forgetting of air (Irigaray 1999 *1983+)‛’ (Oliver 2007, 127).  Quoting Irigaray, 
Oliver states that ‚*r+emembering air and the density of air reminds me that I am 
both connected to and different from those around me‛ (Oliver 2007, 127).  For 
Irigaray, then, ‚the density of air connects and separates everything on earth‛ 
77 
 
and points to a sophisticated perception of materiality and interdependence 
(Oliver 126).  This ‚remembering air,‛ in some ways, mirrors the concept within 
Japanese arts that Carter calls gesturing 
  toward the infinite depth in the background of the foreground object of 
 art in question:  it is a calling to attention, a turning of the mind and heart 
 toward the unseen and eternal inexhaustibility of ultimate reality.  
(Carter 2008, 52) 
This background is ‚a great formless reservoir of potential and actual forms.  .  .  
where the formless self-manifests as form, and eternity now expresses itself in 
time,‛ and reveals, through the possibility of art, ‚a glimpse of the whole of 
which it is an expression in this moment‛ (Carter 2008, 52).  The background, like 
the function of elementals as things that can exceed or engulf perception, hints at 
the irreducibility of the earth/world and the other.  Through an artist’s utilization 
of elementals, the artist and viewer can experience a sensible relation to the earth, 
while qualities and elements of the world can remain sublime, intangible, and 
undisclosed.  Like the depths of the background from which objects and forms 
emanate, elementals create a ‚condition for the freedom of thinking that allows a 
sense of the other‛ because they are based on holistic experience rather than 
dualistic habits (Boetzkes 2010, 110).  This freedom of thinking, could be called 
openness.   
 Interdisciplinary thinker and geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan, suggests that art 
can be utilized to reconceptualize relationships to others by realizing the vastness 
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of all that the world presents.  In the quotation that follows, Tuan highlights the 
way that individuals unfortunately narrow their perception from all that 
experience entails.  He contends that art can illuminate elements of life that could 
be seen as constituting the background because they are generally unexpressed, 
or difficult to express.  By opening one’s perspective, these artistic practices can 
allow for holistic attunement to the background and to others.  For instance, by 
utilizing elementals that represent substances generally unacknowledged or 
unappreciated fully, one fosters sensitivity and new levels of awareness.  These 
concepts support the use of art to develop the perspective on intersubjectivity 
that Irigaray, care ethics, and strands of Asian philosophy strive to develop.  
Tuan says,  
 There is far more to experience than those elements we choose to attend 
 to.  In large measure, culture dictates the focus and range of our 
 awareness.  Languages differ in their capacity to articulate areas of 
 experience.  Pictorial art and rituals supplement language by depicting 
 areas of experience that words fail to frame .  .  .  Art makes images of 
 feeling so that feeling is accessible to contemplation and thought. 
        (Tuan 1977, 148) 
Fostering qualities for interacting positively with objects of experience becomes a 
‘way of being’ that embodied artistic practices develop.  The concept of 
embodiment possesses many nuances.  Drawing from various philosophical 
disciplines in what follows, I attempt to formulate a particular working 
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understanding of embodiment, of its role in artistic practices, and of the way that 
it informs ethics related to these artistic practices.   
 Generally, ‘to embody’ is to infuse concrete or corporeal objects with non-
corporeal elements such as thoughts and ideas.  I assert, however, that 
embodiment is not the uni-directional integration of a mental or spiritual quality 
within a physical presence.  While embodiment generally includes integrating 
what are seen as non-physical elements, like thought, into bodily forms, it is 
more productive and incorporating than that description entails.  Within much 
Eastern philosophy, the mind and the body are, at least originally, one, but may 
come to need reunification (Carter 2008, 10).  Embodiment, then, can be 
considered the unification, or reunification of mind and body that leads one to 
find one’s ‚deeper self, its spontaneous abilities and its connection to the greater 
cosmos,‛ including nature (Carter 2008, 11).   
 Though artistic practices vary greatly from discipline to discipline, there 
are some fundamental embodied practices that appear to span them, as well as 
some fundamental traits that they engender.  These practices and traits run 
counter to the dualistic traits that have a negative ethical impact on 
environmental and intersubjective relationships.  They include specific, 
physically-based modes and formulations of the acts of ‚seeing,‛ of connecting 
the unconscious to the conscious, of defamiliarizing perceptions by habituating 
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creative imagination or ‘artistic intuition’ (Deutsch 1996, 16), and of playing with 
particular ideas and materials.  Within the experience of each of these practices, a 
more open and expansive view of the possibility of others as deserving of ethical 
concern develops, as well as greater awareness and intersubjectivity in 
relationships signifying elements of care. 
 ‚Seeing‛ engenders self-reflective, attentive perception to elements of 
reality that may be taken for granted in everyday interaction.  Connecting the 
unconscious to the conscious allows for deeply felt responses and spontaneous 
reactions to entities, to concepts, and to the self.  Through various defamiliarizing 
techniques within creative imagining, openness to unique relationships and 
connections often occurs.  Finally, embodied free play allows one to interact with 
and appreciate ideas and materials holistically.  All of these actions, I believe, can 
help overcome dualistic patterns of thought.  
The Metamorphosis of ‚Seeing‛ and Transformation of Self   
‚Deepening our way of being-in-the-world‛ (Ghilardi, 146)  
‚To begin to see differently is to begin to act differently and to be different‛  
(Carter 2008, 15). 
 As Val Plumwood states in a passage relating to dualistic modes of 
environmental thought, ‚*s+ystematic devaluation and denial are perceptually 
ingrained in backgrounding, involving systematic not noticing, not seeing‛ 
(Plumwood 1993, 69-70).  The following discussion reinforces the implication of 
81 
 
Plumwood’s statement by explaining how the embodied practice of ‚seeing‛ 
counters dualistic effects of the practice of backgrounding.  In Marcello 
Ghilardi’s comparative philosophical essay, ‚Between Aesthetics and Ethics:  The 
Experience of Seeing in Nicholas Cusanus and Nishida Kitaro,‛ he explains the 
concept of ‚seeing‛ through the work of these two philosophers from divergent 
Eastern and European traditions.   
 Through this inquiry, Ghilardi highlights some elements of what I 
consider to be the seeds of artistic practices that engender a less dualistic, more 
relational ethics.  The idea of ‘seeing’ appears to be the first step into the realm of 
intersubjectivity, the ‚concern‛ and ‚loving consciousness‛ that Eliot Deutsch 
considers the manifestation of creativity.  In their philosophies, Cusanus and 
Nishida investigated ‚learning how to see,‛ where ‘seeing’ was considered to be a 
form of ‘intelligere’, or of ‚being-in-the-world‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 140).  This specific 
mode of ‚seeing‛ functions as the basis for forming a relationship with the world 
based on awareness and sensitivity since it refines perception and awareness 
through receptiveness to the other.  Like the holistic understanding fostered by 
elementals, ‚seeing‛ develops a fuller sense of the other. 
 Through his comparison of the perspectives of Cusanus and Nishida, 
Ghilardi develops the concept of ‘seeing’ as a creative activity that relates 
individual, ‚pure experience,‛ through an organic process, with universal reality 
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(Ghilardi 2008, 144).  For Ghilardi, then, ‚seeing is a way of taking part in the 
world.  .  .  penetrating it not only by reason but also by the senses‛ (Ghilardi 
2008, 144).  
 ‘Seeing’, therefore, is a metaphor and means for holistic responsiveness 
and attentiveness.  While categorically encompassing corporeal elements, it 
might entail sensory activities other than literal ‘seeing’—such as hearing or 
touching.  In fact, Carter states that ‘*a+rt lifts each person who responds, who 
‚hears,‛ to a new level of awareness and possibility, to a renewed level of living 
and acting’ (Carter 2008, 53).  This level of awareness avoids a gaze that does not 
acknowledge the other and that therefore leads to a solipsistic world view.  
Instead, it transforms an individual and inspires a less fragmented or 
reductionist understanding of existence, in which elements that are normally 
dualistically separated, like time/eternity, formed/formless, and part/whole, can 
be seen as connected and can be seen in a healthy ethical relation to each other 
(Carter 2008, 53).    
 According to Carter, Nishida asserts that the element of Japanese culture 
of ‚moving from the subject to the object‛ allows for empathy between the two 
(Carter 2008, 63).  While this may encompass ‚empty*ing+ the self and see*ing+ 
things,‛ it often comes from engaging in a dialogue with, and ‚hearing‛ what 
others have to say as well (‚plants and stones‛ in the example on landscape 
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gardening that Carter lays out) (Carter 2008, 63).  Because ‘seeing’ in this account 
is actually perceptive awareness, rather than mere everyday vision, I contend 
that it is fundamental within artistic creative practices that engage earth others in 
a dialogue.       
 Ghilardi asserts that through ‘seeing’, thus understood, the ‘‛self‛’ and the 
world at large return to an original ‚ethical relation‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 141) since 
this type of ‚*s+eeing is carefulness and attention to what is in the world‛ that ‚is 
broader than individual feeling.‛  As the act of ‚caring, paying attention to, and 
learning to behave in a new way,‛ Ghilardi, therefore, considers ‘seeing’ to be an 
ethical activity focusing on relating to another in a non-instrumental way, one 
that fosters more awareness of the other’s qualities and caring concern for its 
needs.  (Ghilardi 2008, 141, 144).  Again, this formulation resonates with elements 
of care ethics, including the concept of engrossment with the other that leads to 
an empathy, an understanding, and ultimately to a caring relation to the other. 
 One of the ways in which Ghilardi explains the ethical nature of ‚seeing‛ 
as an activity is by showing how it undermines mind/body and individual/world 
dualisms that prevent empathic relationships between individuals (Ghilardi 
2008, 141-42).  Beginning with Cusanus’ interpretation of divine vision in which 
‚seeing is creating,‛ Ghilardi reasons that ‚seeing‛ can uncover relationships 
with those outside oneself—both other humans and ‚transcendent Other*s+‛ 
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(Ghilardi 2008, 141-42).  I believe that this concept of seeing often begins with 
minute material elements within the world like the effect on the artist or viewer 
of the reflective quality of polished stone of which architect/sculptor Maya Lin 
speaks, or the awareness of the varying shades of green representing new plant 
growth.  Artworks, as expressions, as well as self-contained worlds in 
themselves, provide a ground on which to form this type of awareness, as well as 
an understanding of inherent relations between elements.  For example, 
regarding the empathic elements of her artworks, Lin states,  
 A direct empathy exists between the artwork and the viewer.  These 
 works rely on a physical or empathetic response rather than on a learned 
 one from the viewer in order to be understood—or, more accurately, felt.  
         (Lin 2000, 2:03)  
‚Seeing‛ as perceptive awareness, is the basis for creating this empathic 
relationship between art and viewer.     
 By contrasting two Japanese terms related to ‚seeing,‛ Ghilardi explains 
intentionality, or the way one directs consciousness toward something.  One 
interpretation of intentionality, omozashi, is communicative, while the other, 
manazashi, is unidimensional—or what Plumwood might call monological, 
discounting the expression of the other.  Ghilardi states that ‚[o]mozashi is what is 
seen by the other and, at the same time, what sees itself, and also, maybe, what 
sees itself as an other. (Sakabe 1999, 244)‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 142).  These terms, 
therefore, represent two opposing ways of functioning in relation to others.   
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 As a discursive means of relating, omozashi engenders a stance toward 
others that is similar to Plumwood’s intentional recognition stance, which I laid 
out earlier, where the other is seen as possessing its own distinct form of 
existence and worth that is not reducible to the subject’s, often human, 
signification.  Rather than imposing one’s perception of a thing onto it in a one-
sided way, as manazashi might do, omazashi fosters receptivity to what the other 
has to say by realizing elements of interrelation and overlap between self and 
other.  This use of omazashi expresses a context for intentionality toward another 
that is interactive, reciprocal, and mutually interdependent, and I would add, a 
realization of ethical value within another (Ghilardi 2008, 142). So, like 
elementals in Irigaray’s ethics of alterity, omazashi allows, fundamentally, for the 
existence of an other.  Additionally, it allows for mutual receptivity between self 
and other, as well as recognition—seeing the self in the other—and the natural 
empathy and kinship that follows from relating to others as if they were a 
respected part of the self.    
 Carter, moreover, categorizes ‚pure experience‛ as akin to ‚unmediated 
seeing,‛ or a form of ‚non-dual experience‛ that opposes traditional Western 
philosophical lines of thought (Carter 2008, 119).  These forms of ‘seeing’ and of 
‚pure experience‛ are the ‘seeing’ that is ‚prior to the dualistic distinction-
making of the intellect, and .  .  .  intuits things as they are in their depths, in 
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themselves, rather than comparatively‛ (Carter 2008, 119).  This openness that 
precludes habitual categorization of others and makes possible a new 
experiential awareness of them, is a basis for creating works of art that revitalize 
awareness and lead to authentic care, care based on a deeper attunement to the 
other.   
 Ghilardi states that Nishida conceives ‚seeing‛ as a process of personal 
metamorphosis (Ghilardi 2008, 142).  Because for Nishida ‚*s+eeing is a definite 
form of experience, distinct from ordinary, superficial visual perception,‛ it 
constitutes ‚pure experience,‛ weakening the dualism of ‚strong‛ subject 
opposing ‚wholly external object.‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 142).  This form of experience, 
therefore, allows an individual to reformulate his/her relationship to others 
(Ghilardi 2008, 142). ‚Pure experience‛ is direct experience.  ‚Seeing,‛ Nishida 
further asserts, is a ‚dynamic relation,‛ that precludes reduction of a subject to a 
fixed essence.  Nishida says,   
 ‚I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an 
 individual, but that an individual exists because there is an experience.  I 
 thus arrived at the idea that experience is more fundamental than 
 individual difference (Nishida 1990, XXX.)‛ 
(Ghilardi 2008, 142)  
‛Seeing,‛ as pure experience, therefore, reveals the continuity of existence 
between object and subject and functions as ‘‛acting intuition‛.  .  .  ‚movement 
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and relationship‛ that engender the ‚encounter of subject and object‛ (Ghilardi 
2008, 142).                 
 ‚Seeing,‛ then, provides a means of personal transformation and of 
opening ‘to the ‚other‛’ (Ghilardi 2008, 152).  The openness engendered by 
‚seeing‛ fosters the ‘‛between‛’ of human existence, that ‚continuity of 
discontinuity‛ that ‚shapes the forms of life as they affect our relationship to 
others, our identity and our difference‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 152).  That is, though 
distinctions exist between entities, so do interdependence and overlap.  Ghilardi 
maintains that while ‚seeing involves the senses,‛ the perceptual level leads to 
one deeper than the sensual surface, a level that is ‚one with the profundity‛ it 
conceals (Ghilardi 2008, 146).  This profundity may encompass Japanese 
philosophy’s background, or the sublime that stems from the overflowing sense 
of perception fostered by awareness of the elemental.  As John Dewey states,  
 [t]he sensible surface of things is never merely a surface.  One can 
 discriminate rock from flimsy tissue-paper by the surface alone, so 
 completely have the resistances of touch and the solidities due to stresses 
 of the entire muscular system been embodied in vision.  
        (Dewey 1934, 30)  
 
Dewey’s statement suggests that the literal, quotidian act of ‘seeing’ is a means of 
accessing a deeper attunement to things that ‘seeing’ as perception entails.  In 
this formulation, awareness does not end with the seen surface of objects, rather, 
it correlates with it as the first step of understanding another.  Having 
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experienced the world in a bodily way, a simple visual recognition of something 
like the rock, in Dewey’s example, is a sign for a whole range of qualities 
associated with it.  Perception within art may also utilize this quotidian 
recognition to call on a deeper, more sublime experience of an object or idea. 
For example, with religion as his paradigm for transformation through 
‚seeing,‛ Ghilardi argues that at the ‚highest levels of refinement and 
authenticity,‛ ‚*p+oetic and artistic inspiration transform‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 146).  
Therefore, art ‚surpasses all form even though it works with form‛ (Ghilardi 
2008, 146).  Within art, form and imagination rely on each other intrinsically 
(Deutsch 1996, 16).  Artistic expression is intertwined with artistic imagination 
and intuition and often the two are formed interdependently through the 
practice of physically creating a form, which in turn is influenced by ‘seeing’ as 
perception.     
 Finally, Ghilardi states that by liberating and varying ‚rigid notions of 
identity‛ and ‚cultural and intellectual habits of thought,‛ artistic practices 
utilizing ‚seeing‛ can open individual and relational experience to the diversity 
and richness of experience in what appears to be an anti-reductionist mode of 
being (Ghilardi 2008, 153).   This liberation is a means of altering those automatic 
instrumental uses of things that come from everyday habituation grounded in 
cultural norms.   
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By focusing on the physical materials, and utilizing the special mode of 
perceptive ‘seeing’, one avoids taking others for granted based on abstracted 
views.  For example, the difference in appreciation of the Husky breed of dog, 
will be quite different if one reads a book about it, or one interacts with one.  You 
could read the fact that each piece of fur on its body possesses three distinct 
levels or layers, each one providing a different type of protection from the 
elements—heat retention, water resistance, etc.  However, if you perceive and 
engage with the fur—seeing and feeling it physically understanding its relation 
to the activities of an actual dog, you will have a much fuller awareness of it. 
 In summary, ‘seeing’ as perception, could be accomplished through any 
type of sensory bodily encounter.  As ‚pure experience‛ it comes before much of 
the mediation of other ways of relating to others.  It is a dynamic, receptive mode 
of thought and feeling that allows one to foster empathy and concern for its 
objects.  Within artistic practices, furthermore, it seems to bring about new ways 
of relating to others, often through play.    
Play 
 When discussing what he calls, ‚the evolutionary value of play,‛ in his 
book Free Play:  Improvisation in Life and Art, Stephen Nachmanovitch states 
that play ‚fosters richness of response and adaptive flexibility‛ (Nachmanovitch, 
43).  Play is ‚the free spirit of exploration‛ that manifests ‚fresh, interactive ways 
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of relating with people, animals, things, ideas, images, ourselves‛ 
(Nachmanovitch 1990, 43).  Nachmanovitch sees play as an intrinsically 
satisfying activity, which focuses ‚on process, not product‛ (Nachmanovitch 
1990, 45), and therefore, also acknowledges the importance of practice, if not, 
over theory, then at least, used in tandem with it.  In terms of breaking down 
dualisms, play   challenges ‚social hierarchies,‛ develops relationships and 
unites ‚elements that were formerly separate,‛ allows for novel sequencing of 
actions, reinterpretations of relating, and the ability ‚to rearrange our capacities 
and our very identity so that they can be used in unforeseen ways‛ 
(Nachmanovitch 1990, 43). 
 For nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Schiller, play was a 
way to re-create and reiterate the character of the individual by unifying feeling 
and thinking (Schiller 2004, 66-67).  Art, the aesthetic, was the means for 
achieving the state of play, the play impulse, for Schiller, since art would imbue 
feeling/nature with form and add a sensual element to form/rationality (Schiller 
2004, 60-84).  By bringing harmony to the individual through the play impulse, 
the individual gained the ability to free itself from constraint and inhibition and 
to develop a ‚free disposition‛;  morality could become more nuanced by 
incorporating sensory and intuitive elements;  and individuals’ capacities to 
foster harmony with the community would evolve due to Beauty’s public 
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function to confer on one ‚a social character‛ through a form of communication 
that unites society (Schiller 2004, 99, 138).  In this aesthetic State, all would be free 
citizens with equal rights (Schiller 2004, 140).     
 In this way, following the influence of an idealized ancient Greek notion 
in which humanity was based in nature, and culture was un-segmented and  
encompassed harmony, Schiller sought to imbue everyday life and work with 
Beauty and create a level of humanity above the realm of the mechanistically 
ordered political one (Schiller 2004, 38).  By following the Greek example, Schiller 
intended to unify the material and the rational, and wrote of the Greeks:  
‚*h+owever high Reason might soar, it always drew its subject matter lovingly 
after it‛ (Schiller 2004, 38).  This ‘semblance’, for Schiller, would not deceive, but 
only enrich and authenticate humanity and the self (Schiller 2004, 38).  Art’s 
process, for Schiller, the play impulse, and its product—Beauty, with its public 
communicative function, transformed the individual by bringing feeling and 
thinking together in a sense of inner freedom in order to create a morality that 
would be developed naturally and habitually through art encompassing ‚a 
delight in appearance, a disposition towards ornament and play‛ (Schiller 2004, 
125, 60-140). 
 A predominant element of creative artistic play that transforms the artist 
and the viewer encompasses fostering the possibility of relating to others in a less 
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reductionist and more open way.  Using practices, like play, that include bodily 
and holistic elements can break habits based on dualisms that exclude these 
elements when relating to others.  As the next section shows, play is a way of 
blurring the line between conscious and unconscious and can bring together 
elements from both realms of thought in a dynamic configuration.   
Conscious and Unconscious 
Maya Lin’s Holistic Embodied Engagement  
‚I think with my hands‛ (Lin 2000, 3:09). 
 In the Chapter, ‚On Making,‛ in Maya Lin’s book Boundaries, Lin 
discusses her process for developing her designs.  Her method, which includes a 
type of free play, marries conscious and unconscious elements, with results that 
often create a profound and holistic effect on the viewer.  Beginning by writing 
about a project, Lin attempts to articulate the ‘goal’ of the work (Lin 2000, 3:05).  
Instead of envisioning a particular incarnation of an idea, she allows herself to 
ponder the reason for the work, often commissioned for a particular person or 
group and specific to a particular physical site (Lin 2000, 3:05).   
 Though unsure at this point in the process whether it will ultimately be 
useful in the final design, Lin researches the physical and cultural aspects of a 
work’s site.  For two memorial designs, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and the 
Civil Rights Memorial, the research done before designing them, states Lin, 
presented her with a ‚general direction‛ that, in both instances, she would 
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ultimately take (Lin 2000, 3:05-3:07).  The ideas she took with her when she 
visited these sites helped her to ‚imagine almost instantly the form each 
memorial would take‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07).   
 After initially visiting a site, she returns to her studio with the experience 
of the visit ‚in the back of her mind‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07).  Not knowing what she is 
seeking yet, she avoids focusing ‚too directly or self-consciously on the search 
for an idea for the artwork.  .  .  and rarely arrive[s] at an idea by consciously 
sitting down at a desk and trying to figure out what‛ to do (Lin 2000, 3:07).  She 
makes models instantaneously stating ‚I cannot force a design;  I do not see this 
process as being under my conscious control.  It is a process of percolation, with 
the form eventually finding its way to the surface‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07).   
 She considers her creative process as a balance between analytic study 
based on her research, and ‚in the end, a purely intuited gesture‛ (Lin 2000, 
3:09).  Regarding the large outdoor landscape sculpture, ‚Wave Field,‛ she states 
that she ‚finally realized that I would not understand it or be able to predict if 
the form would work until I built it at its actual scale‛ (Lin 2000, 3:13).  Clearly, 
her process of making is an artistic practice that is embodied and holistic, using 
elements of kokoro—Japanese mind/heart, conscious verbal and analytic 
reasoning, emotional and intuitive components, all intermingled with actual 
physical modeling and building.  
94 
 
 The purpose of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial for Lin, was ‚accepting 
and coming to terms with a loved one’s death‛ (Lin 2000, 4:09).  This work is an 
example of an artist ‚seeing‛ and responding to numerous contextual elements:  
a physical site, a powerful idea, a vulnerable audience, and varied physical 
materials. Maya Lin’s response to these elements is a graceful illustration of an 
individual artist following a lifelong ‚Way,‛ or path to form ethically caring 
relationships.  Her initial ‚seeing‛ and response to the site where the memorial 
would exist inspired her design.  She ‚had a simple impulse to cut into the earth.  
.  .  and imagined taking a knife and cutting into the earth, opening it up, an 
initial violence and pain that in time would heal‛ (Lin 2000, 4:10).  Reflecting on 
her creation, she states, 
 I always saw the wall as pure surface, an interface between light and 
 dark, where I cut the earth and polished its open edge.  The wall 
 dematerializes as a form and allows the names to become the object, a 
 pure and reflective surface that would allow visitors the chance to see 
 themselves with the names.  I do not think I thought of the color black as a 
 color, more as the idea of a dark mirror into a shadowed mirrored image 
 of the space, a space we cannot enter and from which the names separate 
 us, an interface between the world of the living and the world of the 
 dead.  
        (Lin 2000, 4:14)  
 As Dewey asserts, what is evoked in the act of expression, is not merely a 
discharge of emotion, but, rather ‚is qualitative, a transformation of energy into 
thoughtful action through assimilation of meanings from the background of past 
experiences‛ (Dewey 1934, 63).  In this way, these stored experiences are 
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‚revived‛ through ‚resistance from surroundings .  .  .  that generates curiosity 
and solicitous care‛ and allows for the awareness of the self (Dewey 1934, 62).  
Lin’s memories and stored experiences included many elements—her formal 
training, her exposure to nature and to modeling clay in her childhood, her 
intuitive approach to the sensitivity of building a memorial, and even the social 
obstacles of being a young Asian woman attempting to build the memorial for a 
war fought against Asians.  Lin’s responses to the project were imbued with 
particular understandings coming from them.  She integrated particular elements 
into the memorial based on the interactions between her goals and the challenges 
posed by her stored experiences.    
 The resistance that Dewey speaks of resembles Irigaray’s ‚screen of 
resting‛ that acknowledges the alterity of elementals.  Both concepts involve 
sensing the distinctness of the environmental factors and allowing an individual 
to integrate them into his or her ‘way of being’ in a productive way.  For Dewey, 
therefore, it is the integration of ‚the natural and the cultivated‛ in ‚acts of social 
intercourse‛ that exist as art (Dewey 1934, 65).          
Therefore, an authentic artwork, for Dewey, possesses specific elements.  
It is ‚a construction in time;‛  it is brought out of the artist through objective 
pressures working on ‚natural impulses and tendencies;‛ and it utilizes ‚the 
interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies‛ to fashion ‚an 
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integral experience‛ (Dewey 1934, 67).  The element of time highlights the 
ephemeral, changing quality of the context to which each individual relates.  Art 
is created in time, as well, and the moment of engagement in the creation of a 
work can encompass the serendipitous integration of conscious and unconscious 
within the flow of time, as well as the understanding of one’s relation to the 
other and to the universal, as well.      
 As Maya Lin’s creative process emphasizes, both the external physical 
materials used to form the artwork, and the artist’s ‘‛inner‛ materials, images, 
observations, memories and emotions’ undergo change (Dewey 1934, 77).  
Important for intersubjective ethics, with the imagining and placement of 
physical materials, the artist’s ‚ideas and feelings are also ordered‛ (Dewey 1934, 
78):   
 [T]he physical process develops imagination, while imagination is 
 conceived in terms of concrete material.  Only by progressive organization 
 of ‚inner‛ and ‚outer‛ material in organic connection with each other can 
 anything be produced that is not a learned document or illustration of 
 something familiar. 
        (Dewey 1934, 78) 
Because artistic practices as described by Dewey are more than a one-sided 
transformation of materials by the artist, but in fact, often exist as a means for 
profound transformation of the artist related to materials, these practices 
counteract the traits that negatively affect the environment.  Artistic materials 
and ideas are inspired by elements of world.   
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 Artists work with physical materials in ways that discover their physical 
limits, including the ways that they can be used, as well as the entities and ideas 
that they can represent, or relate to.  Often through the ‚pure experiences‛ of 
seeing, playing, and creating, new, personal, yet universally grounded meanings 
can come to be associated with these substances.  Since these ingredients are of 
the real world, forming sensitive relationships to them and between them fosters 
new perceptions that allow entities to have more than instrumental meaning.  
Therefore, dualisms, discontinuity, reductionism, and colonization maintain less 
of a grip on one’s view toward the other.  
In the next segment, I discuss another way in which art establishes a sense 
of openness between the artist, or the audience, and the subjects of a work.  Being 
entrenched within a habitualized view of an entity often precludes awareness of 
one’s ethical stance toward it.  The possibility of deliberating about how one 
perceives another ethically is taken for granted if one lacks a sense of openness.  
A destabilizing, defamiliarizing view of objects and elements within the world, 
can help to awaken a sense of openness.  In what follows, by utilizing poetic 
writing as an example, I trace a view of the art of poetry that asserts that it is a 
means of reinvigorating perceptions that take elements of the world for granted.   
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Poetic Art—Defamiliarization and Awareness of the Other                          
William Carlos Williams, ‚The Locust Tree in Flower‛ 
 Though poetry is often recorded in writing, as American Poet Laureate, 
Robert Pinsky states, at its heart, ‚poetry is a vocal, which is to say a bodily, art‛ 
with its medium being ‚a human body‛ (Pinsky 1998, 8).  Furthermore, the body 
is not that of an expert, but rather that of the audience (or the poet can be his own 
audience):  ‚*t+he reader’s breath and hearing embody the poet’s words‛ making 
the ‚art physical, intimate, vocal, and individual‛ (Pinsky 1998, 8).  It utilizes the 
intellect and the body holistically, and, Pinsky argues, for ‚specific uses,‛ for 
holding ‚things in memory,‛ for expressing ‚feelings and ideas rapidly and 
memorably,‛ and for communicating all these things with others (Pinsky 1998, 
9). 
 In the chapter, ‚Mallarmé and Valéry and the Essence of Poetry,‛ from his 
book Essays on the Nature of Art, Eliot Deutsch utilizes Wallace Fowlie’s 
particular interpretation of Mallarmé’s views on poetry.  Fowlie asserts that 
‘‛The meaning of a poetic work is inseparable from its structure‛’ (Deutsch 1996, 
42).  According to Deutsch, therefore, ‚*t+he language of a poem, which cannot 
be changed or paraphrased, is its meaning‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42).  By pursuing 
some of the perspectives of Mallarmé and of Valéry, Deutsch concludes that 
creating a poem ‘out of nothing’, as well as experiencing it on an aesthetic level, 
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‚encompass all the cognitive insights and emotional responses traditionally 
associated with religion‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42).  Like religion, which is often seen as 
an ephiphantic mechanism for opening to the sublime, one can feel a holistic 
sense of awe when creating or experiencing a work of poetic art. 
 This creative process and the language of poetry, as opposed to holding a 
mostly symbolic function, like religion, however, are autonomous, or self-
generating (Deutsch 1996, 42).  The quality of autonomy in art is its ability to 
function with a value immanent to its intrinsic self-relations.  That is, because a 
poem or work of art can exist in a self-sufficient state, separate from its 
relationship to the world, or to its inspiration, a poem may thoroughly reinvent 
or reinterpret an idea or subject from the bounds of everyday habituation.  
Further supporting this view of poetry, Terence Hawkes, in Structuralism and 
Semiotics, writes that according to Russian formalist, Viktor Shklovsky, ‚the 
essential function of poetic art is to counteract the process of habituation 
encouraged by routine everyday modes of perception‛ (Hawkes 1977, 62).  This 
concept of ‘making strange’, or ostranenie, is based on the existence of literary 
devices such as rhythm, meter, and ‚the use of sound.  .  .  as a meaningful 
element in its own right,‛ rather than as a mere representation of ‚sense‛ (as the 
underlying meaning behind a signifier) (Hawkes 1977, 62). 
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 These defamiliarizing elements, often integral to poetic language, call to 
mind the issues brought forth by Plumwood and Ghilardi regarding ‘seeing’.  
The sense of poetry I proposed includes an understanding about awareness, in 
the sense of ‘seeing’, and the lack of awareness coming from ‚routine everyday 
modes of perception‛ similar to the concerns advanced by Plumwood regarding 
dualisms and nature (Hawkes 1977, 62).  For Plumwood, as previously stated, 
systematic devaluation of ‘others’ involves systematically not ‘seeing’.  
Regarding poetry, Hawkes advances Shklovsky’s opinion about losing insight, 
stating, 
 We very readily cease to ‘see’ the world we live in, and become 
 anesthetized to its distinctive features.  The aim of poetry is to reverse that 
 process, to defamiliarize that with which we are overly familiar.  .  . 
        (Hawkes 1977, 62)   
 The specific method used in poetic discourse calls attention to itself ‚as a 
‘medium’ over and above the ‘message’ it contains‛ exceeding the conveyance of 
information that occurs in regular discourse (Hawkes 1977, 63).  In this way, 
poetry cultivates awareness through a mechanism similar to Ghilardi’s concept 
of ‘seeing’ as perceptive awareness.  For Deutsch, the function and aspects of 
poetry that elevate it above regular language allow it to ‚yield a pure musical 
response‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42).  For Shklovsky, according to Hawkes, the same 
function and aspects help one (presumably a poet and/or his or her audience) to 
locate a lost ‚childlike, non-jaded vision‛ (Hawkes 1977, 62): 
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 The poet thus aims to disrupt ‘stock responses’, and to generate a 
 heightened awareness:  to restructure our ordinary perception of ‘reality’, 
 so that we end by seeing the world instead of numbly recognizing it:  or at 
 least so that we end by designing a ‘new’ reality to replace the (no less 
 fictional) one which we have inherited and become accustomed to.  
         (Hawkes 1977, 62) 
 Two versions of the poem, ‚The Locust Tree in Flower,‛ by William 
Carlos Williams, illustrate the way in which poetry can refresh one’s awareness 
of the world.  In its reinvention of elements of the natural world, particularly, 
poetry can inspire new, empathic relationships with it in the place of the habitual 
ones of denied dependency.  Williams’ poems are particularly interesting when 
seen as a set because the second version is more minimal, sparer, and less 
directly descriptive of the locust tree.  Both versions are themselves complete and 
elegant poems that create a sort of portrait of a locust tree through the delicate 
rhythm Williams creates with his novel use of line and verse breaks, as well as 
his description of parts of the tree’s body and life-cycle.   However, an 
intensification of ostranenie stems from reading the first version and then the 
second.   
The Locust Tree in Flower   
(First version) 
     
    Among 
    the leaves 
    bright 
 
    green 
    of wrist-thick 
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    tree 
 
    and old 
    stiff broken 
    branch 
 
    ferncool 
    swaying 
    loosely strung— 
  
    come May 
    again 
    white blossom 
 
    clusters 
    hide 
    to spill 
 
    their sweets 
    almost  
    unnoticed 
 
    down 
    and quickly  
    fall 
 
The Locust Tree in Flower  
(Second version) 
 
    Among 
    of 
    green 
 
    stiff 
    old 
    bright 
 
    broken 
    branch 
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    come 
 
    white 
    sweet 
    May 
 
    again 
 
(Williams 1985 ed., 93-94) 
 
 I believe that by reading the first and then the second version of the poem 
in order, the reader develops a ‘heightened awareness’, or receptiveness to the 
idea of the locust tree as a unique intentional living being.  The consequential 
enhancement of the defamiliarization of the language resulting from reading the 
poems in order is balanced by a feeling of familiarity, like déjà vu, stemming 
from the similarities in the poems.  This level of awareness is akin to a bodily 
understanding and an emotional, even visceral, reaction to the idea of the tree 
that is filtered through the self-contained, autonomous worlds of the poems’ 
unique language.  
 Native American writing is another example illustrating how poetry and 
writing defamiliarize language in order to advance positive elements of 
intersubjective ethics, awareness and care.  Native American author Jeanette 
Armstrong defamiliarizes English language by taking English words and using 
them in ways that create more musical rhythms echoing N’silxchn language and 
connecting it to particular rhythms of the land (Armstrong 1998, 192).   Native 
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American writing thus engages poet and reader with the language in a novel 
way, drawing out possible relationships with the natural world.  This 
reinvention both maintains an imagination-based connection to the land and 
allows for a freedom to use language in a way that counteract colonization 
through a creative reinvention of identity.  As Native American writer Elizabeth 
Woody writes regarding Native tribes in Oregon, ‚*w+e maintain an intangible 
connection to the land, people, and culture that is described and known as the 
Voice of the Land‛ (Woody 1998, 153).    
Through language that ‚emulates the land and the sky in its unique flow 
around‛ one, an author can recreate the sensual responses to the land and 
transmit meaning related to lost times within Native Americans’ cultural history 
(Armstrong 1998, 180-81).  The process of writing, therefore, allows natural 
phenomena to speak to the authors, who ‚affirm the concept of a reciprocal 
relationship with all things in Creation‛ through their works (Ortiz 1998, xv).  
Jeannette C. Armstrong, in ‚Land Speaking, emphasizes ‚the significance 
that original Native languages and their connection to our lands have in 
compelling the reinvention of the enemy’s language for our perspectives as 
indigenous writers‛ (Armstrong 1998, 175).  This is a new way of looking at 
language, land, and their relationships that is ethical because it avoids taking 
language and land for granted by fostering awareness of their interdependence.  
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These practices reflect an important point advanced by Edward Said, from 
Culture and Imperialism, quoted in Postcolonial Ecologies, that ‚*i+f there is 
anything that radically distinguishes the imagination of anti-imperialism, it is the 
primacy of the geographical in it,‛ as a way to counteract ‚the loss of locality to 
the outsider.‛  Said contends that, at first, ‚the land is recoverable only through 
imagination,‛(Said 1993, 77, quoted in Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 3).  Tuan, 
Furthermore, asserts that ‚*h+omeland is an important type of place‛ and that 
one’s connection, or attachment to it, is often intense (Tuan 1977, 149).  He states 
that, 
Should destruction occur we may reasonably conclude that the people 
would be thoroughly demoralized, since the ruin of their settlement 
implies the ruin of their cosmos.  Yet this does not necessarily happen.  
Human beings have strong recuperative powers.  Cosmic views can be 
adjusted to suit new circumstances.  With the destruction of one ‚center of 
the world,‛ another can be built next to it .  .  .   
       (Tuan 1977, 149-50) 
I believe that Said hints at this sense of recuperation through the 
readjustment to place when he speaks of ‘recovery’ of the land.  However, in 
most instances of colonization, the land itself will not be recoverable, rather, the 
‘adjustment’ of cosmic views of which Tuan speaks, has to take place by 
developing new ways of relating to land—often through artistic imagination, like 
that of Woody, Armstrong, and Hill.       
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 Next, I will summarize the points I have made thus far.  Following that 
brief summation, in the section on artistic engagement and activism, one of the 
‚movements‛ I will discuss will deal with place, that of Native American’s 
attempts to rediscover their identity and that of the land within their 
communities and lives they lead—so affected by colonization.     
Before discussing the possibilities that can come from incorporating 
engaged artistic practice, or similar modes of practice, more prevalently into 
daily life, I will sum up my argument thus far.  In laying a foundation for my 
paradigm, I first explained the particular Western historical tradition of dualistic 
thought.  Val Plumwood’s concise discussion of the aspects of dualisms and 
several effects that they engender, often implicitly within culture, revealed how 
those entrenched in these dualisms can, seemingly logically denigrate the natural 
environment.  Furthermore, the more closely associated with ‘non-rational 
nature’ that a person or entity appears to be, the more justified the ‘master’ 
imagines itself to be in subordinating the other, within Plumwood’s model.  
 I also introduced Vandana Shiva’s interpretation of reductionism as a 
means of illustrating the way that much of Western culture has come to see the 
natural world as mere mechanizations to be controlled and ordered by 
humanity.  By distancing themselves from the natural world, as well as those 
people who form more interdependent relationships with it, those who can, 
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attempt to control nature in order to maximize profits.  As Shiva’s work 
supported, this is often done at the expense of the very functions that are 
associated with elements of nature, a seed’s ability to reproduce naturally, for 
instance.  While these reductionist practices discount many elements of natural 
systems in a myopic way, they also form means of controlling groups of people 
who formerly had access to common natural resources. 
 While there is much evidence and thought to support a view of continuity 
between nature and culture, traditional Western approaches, highlight elements 
of discontinuity.  Taking the continuity and interdependence of nature to culture 
has costly consequences for earth others and humans’ future prospects.  As 
Sherry Ortner and John Dewey acknowledge, nature and culture exist in tandem, 
and in fact, cannot actually be separated within the ‚real world.‛  Though this 
continuity is often unacknowledged in the contemporary world, there is much 
scientific support of its existence.  Above and beyond these contentions, Dewey 
asserts that the environment actually forms a vital part of all aspects of human 
life—including—and, perhaps, especially, the artistic and sublime.   
 I separated colonization as a more explicit and active negative effect of 
dualism, reductionism, and discontinuity, one that extends their effects more 
blatantly to more groups of others—non-human and human alike.  By providing 
examples of the effects of colonizing actions, and relating their underlying basis 
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to perspectives that are extremely dominant within contemporary Western 
culture, I attempted to show how far-reaching both its patterns of thought and its 
effects extend.   
 In the sections on alternative forms of power and care ethics, I attempted 
to uncover some underlying elements of power and to tie them to dualisms.  
Understanding some of the power bases for the dualistic negative traits affecting 
intersubjective ethical relationships with others was a way to begin the 
discussion on care ethics as a means of utilizing more positive relationships and 
forms of power to advance ethical relationships.  Ultimately, my goal was to tie 
the underlying tenets of care ethics to lifelong engaged artistic practices in order 
to work toward a similar ethical goal. 
 In discussing theory, application, and practice in relation to comparative 
ethics, I attempted to show the Eastern philosophical roots for utilizing these 
processes in a sequence that is the inverse from the contemporary Western 
method.  Forming a philosophical basis through the introduction of the intimacy 
world orientation in order to make practice the initial and predominant aspect of 
ethical decision making, I prepared the reader for the subsequent connection I 




 In the section on the positive ethical effects of engaged physical artistic 
practices, I laid out the four practices that I felt countered successfully the 
negative traits that foster inattentiveness to the environment, specifically, and to 
others, in general.  I believe that because these practices foster involvement, 
appreciation, and connection, or kinship between subject and object, they 
affectively counteract the negative traits affecting the environment.  Particular 
bodily ways of ‘seeing’, connecting conscious and unconscious, utilizing free 
play, and defamiliarizing the everyday perceptions leading to unawareness 
constitute these positive methods and practices.  ‘Seeing’, in my formulation, is 
perceptive awareness, the basis of what care ethics considers ‚engrossment‛ with 
the other, which entails hearing the other and understanding its needs.  
Furthermore, by fostering perceptive awareness, underlying power relations that 
create unquestioned cultural norms begin to come to light.    
 Since embodied artistic practices deal with physical elements that the 
artist often models or becomes receptive to (in the case of earth art), opening 
one’s perception is fundamental to these practices.  When one’s perception is 
open, a new attunement toward others is awakened in a shared process of 
discovery that is a basis of the ethics of care.  Since unawareness and reduction of 
the other are major elements of dualist thought and the negative attitudes that it 
fosters, ‘seeing’ is a powerful way to counteract them.  For instance, perceiving 
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things with the recognition that they have their own intentions, is the first step to 
avoiding habits of instrumentalization, incorporation, and colonizing acts.   
 Play forms an extension of the attunement that is based on ‘seeing’.  The 
individual begins to develop an intuition about the differences and similarities of 
others.  The idea of continuity forms, not as a seamless harmony with others, but 
as an experimental and experiential way of engaging with them in a true life 
context.  Play is a way of fully participating with elements of existence, and the 
use of elementals, in particular, highlights those substances that are often taken 
for granted, in a sense, giving them a voice.  This marriage of conscious and 
unconscious found through holistic creative play counteracts the non-
participation of reductionism that Shiva explained as being so destructive to 
earth others. 
 Using creativity to defamiliarize habitualized perceptions creates room for 
newly realized thoughts to spring from the unconscious.  The serendipity within 
the creation of a work of art that allows unconsidered relationships to arrive and 
be considered, can extend toward other entities as well—people, non-human 
animals, the environment—that have been seen in a habitually reductive and 
dualistic way.  These artistic practices can form a lifelong ‚Way‛ of interacting 
with things, elementals, and others.  They make it possible to open oneself to 
new ideas, and to the fullness that others have to offer.  This understanding 
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fosters an appreciation of the uniqueness of others of all types, and engenders a 
mode of awareness and concern.   In what follows, I try to bring the discussion 
full circle, from the external to the internal aspects of the individual, to related 
aspects and responses of another, to a group of others within the external world.   
 First, I flesh out some of the ways that creative practices connect to 
activism through the example of the documentary film, ‚Blue Vinyl.‛   Then, I 
will give three brief, introductory examples of artistic practices that have 
connected groups into social ‚movements‛ that utilize an ethical component 
similar to what one could call activism.  The first is the way in which Native 
American writing is active in cultural discourse.  Second, is the presence of tikkun 
olam in the work of the twentieth century Jewish American painter, Ben Shahn.  
Third, is the dynamic relationship between folk music and the Civil Rights 
movement.  
IV. Affecting Others, Communal Practice, Activism 
Activism through the Artistic Choices of Openness and Defamiliarizing 
Humor in ‚Blue Vinyl‛  
‚Art makes images of feeling so that feeling is accessible to contemplation and 
thought‛ (Tuan 1977, 148).  
 While at first glance, art and activism may seem only tentatively related, if 
at all, bearing in mind the preceding discussions of power, of intersubjectivity, of 
care ethics, of practice, and particularly, of physically engaged artistic practice, 
the relationship between them becomes more apparent.  Consider that I 
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advanced the concept of art as a mechanism for embodied ethical practice.  The 
term ‘activism’, includes the word ‘active’ within it, and utilizes action as a social 
force.  Merriam-Webster’s defines ‘activism’ as:  ‚a doctrine or practice that 
emphasizes direct vigorous action especially in support of or opposition to one 
side of a controversial issue‛ (Merriam Webster).  While many elements, or 
forces, of power shape how one feels about an issue, as well as the action one 
ultimately takes, actually performing ‚direct vigorous actions‛ of activism 
appear to be another level of force within the many at work in Foucaultian 
biopower.   
Like the artistic practices and the ‚Ways,‛ activism engages one in a 
holistic, contextual manner.  Intellectual beliefs, visceral and emotional responses 
to issues, and active, discursive interactions with other activists and the entities 
that a movement addresses, encompass some of the practices of activism.  The 
discussion of artistic practices has focused on the way that these practices form a 
basis for an individual and an audience to engage physically, directly, and 
holistically with an element, idea, or an other in order to form a more 
intersubjective, more positive, ethical relationship with it that engenders care.  
Activism, like these practices, engages one in such a direct holistic way.  That is 
to say, an activist is compelled by a deep personal response to act in support of, 
or against, an issue or cause similar to the integrated responses fostered by the 
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‚Ways‛ and practices that relate artist and viewer to the other.  Using art for 
activism, therefore, can inspire the care that embodied artistic engagement 
fosters and integrate it with the force of activism’s direct action in ‚support of or 
in opposition to one side of a controversial issue‛ (Merriam-Webster).     
 Arlene Plevin unearths some crucial links between art and activism by 
analyzing ‚Blue Vinyl,‛ Judith Helfand’s and Daniel Gold’s film documentary. 
Her article clarifies some of the ways that elements of art and activism mutually 
reinforce one another.  ‚Blue Vinyl’s‛ documentary narrative follows Helfand’s 
search for information about the safety of vinyl and its manufacturing process.  
Helfand takes a simple act to begin her quest for knowledge about 
environmental safety and justice:  her parents decision to replace the dilapidated 
wood on their home with ‚blue vinyl siding,‛ ‘‛embossed.  .  .  with fake 
woodprint‛’ (Plevin 2004, 226).  The artistic choices that are used to develop the 
story illustrate how art can foster the power of activism through the awareness 
brought about by artistic ‘seeing’ and defamiliarization.  This awareness can 
stimulate an individual’s understanding of and empathy related to a situation 
and prompt one to become involved with the embodied engagement in relation 
to a cause, an involvement that defines activism.   
 Having suffered from cervical cancer due to her mother’s use of DES, 
Diethylstilbestrol, when pregnant, Helfand is aware of latent and purposely 
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concealed product dangers of which consumers are often unaware.  One of 
Helfand’s targets within the movie is the general lack of awareness that 
commonly exists because ordinary products are used without consideration of 
their human or environmental effects under the assumption that those who make 
them will honor the consumer’s trust.  She is concerned with the ‚unexamined 
consumer ideologies‛ that readily accept as safe the products offered to them—
‚along with that perspective’s corresponding neglect and sacrifice of 
economically powerless and usually invisible communities‛ (Plevin 2004, 226).   
The devastating impact of DES on Helfand, Plevin suggests, has inspired 
Helfand’s development of a personal perspective that represents a certain 
holism, or continuity, between varying levels of her life experience.  She sees 
nature, as represented in the nature of her body, in continuity with external 
stimuli, such as the pollution and toxicity related to vinyl’s manufacture and 
existence.  She relates her body and these stimuli to her position within her home 
and her community, as well as within the larger global environment.  In other 
words, nature and culture are always in relation to one another, and the health of 
both humans and the environment exists interdependently in correspondence for 
her.  The film provides a way to communicate her perspective through the 
thought-provoking creative and artistic choices she makes.  These choices 
defamiliarize vinyl, a commonplace object of consumption, whose safety is 
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normally left unquestioned.  This stylistic approach allows viewers to reevaluate 
the subject matter using their fresh, more informed intellectual and emotional 
responses, garnered from deeper, more holistic perspectives.    
   Plevin describes the movie as ‚a blueprint for future endeavors‛ of 
environmental activism (Plevin 2004, 227).  The movie represents such a 
blueprint because some of its important qualities foster ‚relationships that cross 
class, race, and geography‛ (Plevin 2004, 227).  Making intersubjective 
relationships between entities more explicit, regardless of their differences, thus 
exposing the interdependence of individuals and groups variously affected by an 
ethical decision is one of the approaches of care ethics.  By illustrating the 
detrimental effects of vinyl on the environment and human health in a way that 
links the viewer to the individuals suffering and to the detrimental 
environmental effects helps create an empathic view of the effects of vinyl, one 
that ‘objective’ facts alone, could not.  For example, a more integrity-oriented 
approach toward these issues of environmental justice might use ‘objective’ data 
related to environmental effects on a particular group of individuals or natural 
environment.  By itself, that data would not inspire the same level of empathy as 
a context related, artistically expressive perspective on the situation such as 
Helfand’s.   
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Since care ethics operates in a more contextual, personal, intimacy-
oriented way by engaging with those who are affected by a decision, it provides 
a way to generate a deeper understanding and concern through activism.  
Utilizing practice, in general, and artistic practices, specifically, activism can 
respond to individuals and groups in a more caring way by engendering 
emotional affect, and responsive sensitivity that can help guide one’s decisions, 
incorporating the perspective of others affected by a choice or policy.  This more 
mutual type of decision-making and activism can help foster the use of 
Plumwood’s ‘intentional recognition stance’ toward human and earth others, 
which emphasizes that the needs and desires of others have ethical import.      
 ‚Blue Vinyl‛ also sensitizes people to possible environmental dangers, 
communicating them by juxtaposing everyday situations that are normally 
incongruous to each other in order to defamiliarize important signals taken for 
granted.  For example, when Helfand goes to Louisiana to investigate the 
manufacturing of one of the major chemical building blocks of vinyl, the film 
shows images of a Mardi Gras celebration next to those of community chemical 
plants expelling pollution into the atmosphere (Plevin 2004, 231).  When an open 
forum is held regarding the vinyl manufacturing, one of the members of the 
Louisiana community who questions the corporation ‚demonstrates a beginning 
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activism—speaking up for one’s convictions and doing it in a public place‛ 
(Plevin 2004, 232).   
 This ‚beginning activism‛ is reminiscent of the ‘power-to’ and ‘power-
with’ of feminist alternatives to power because it cuts through some of the 
prevalent underlying social structures and norms that allow only those in power 
to form judgments that will be heard, and to make decisions.  Like the 
‚beginning activist,‛ the movie encompasses artistic choices that inspire 
activism.  By creating a new awareness of the dangers of vinyl, an everyday item 
usually outside of consideration, Helfand reinvigorates the audience’s sense of 
reality, in a manner similar to the ostranenie of poetic invention.  Plevin suggests 
that Helfand’s actions illuminate the traits of ‚tenacity, even creativity‛, which 
Plevin sees as intrinsic characteristics of activism (Plevin 2004, 233).  
 Plevin insightfully advances the connection between art and activism by 
dubbing a significant element of activism:  ‚the act of making hidden 
connections visible‛ (Plevin 2004, 234).  This idea resonates with the concepts of 
‘seeing’, making the unconscious conscious, and defamiliarization that many 
artistic practices encompass.  It is through the use of ‚the provocative power of 
humor,‛ in Helfand’s case, that she ultimately affects her audience (Plevin 2004, 
231). By using the blue vinyl within the film as if it were a human character she is 
able to place it in a surprising new light.  
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By actually carrying a piece of the vinyl material with her, its presence 
adds a new dimension to the responses inspired by her project.  The way she 
uses the material strongly impacts the responses of players in the film, as well as 
those of the audience.  For example, at one point, she has a meeting with some of 
the manufacturers of the vinyl, and, in a humorous turn, they prevent her from 
bringing the actual slab of it with her to the meeting due to their defensiveness 
and strategizing.  This act instantly highlights the dangers that the manufacturers 
are attempting to hide.   
The care ethics, ‚context-respectful approach,‛ that Helfand advances 
forms connections between the subjects of the film in another sense (Held 1998, 
99).  Because the audience comes to understand the lack of safety of blue vinyl 
through its deep impact on the lives of the individuals exposed to it, its level of 
concern for those affected, as well as for these types of dangers, is raised.  They 
may even be compelled to activism by their new perspective since these 
expressive aspects of the film effectively foster a new, more holistic awareness of 
the ethical outcomes of the use of vinyl.   
By engaging the audience with the question of safety through a personal, 
engaged look at the consequences of the vinyl’s dangers, the film engenders 
empathy and thoughtful responses (Plevin 2004, 227).  Activism, therefore, 
relates to artistic practices through its engaged mechanisms, its action-
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orientation, and its concern.  That is why the use of artistic practice as a means to 
foster an ethical sense of care, is a natural basis for activism.  Before I conclude 
my work, I will briefly highlight three social movements that utilize art as 
activism.   
Native American Writing as Resistance 
‚Whether our struggle is portrayed in a poem or a story, in a film or a television 
show, or in visual art, we choose to struggle about how we conceptualize 
ourselves.  Images we create as a collective entity will either edge us toward 
despair and apathy or unfold inside us and guide us toward the recovery of 
ourselves and the living earth.  We already see and feel these images of healing.  
They wash over us like the waves, and we lend our energies to them because 
they appeal to us from the core of what we are as human beings.  With struggle, 
we will create cultures that give people time to feel alive and to rest on the waves 
of these creative energies.‛ 
(Hill 1998, 91) 
 As previously stated, Native American writing augments natural, land-
based qualities through human creative interpretations and practices, thus 
enhancing the human connection to the land by emphasizing what these authors 
see as a language’s natural association with it.  Several writers attempt to 
synthesize nature and culture through the art of writing in an attempt to 
rediscover a more cohesive, less marginalized sense of identity and community, 
as well as to cultivate their interdependence with earth others.  They play with 
language, often developing hybrids of English and Native languages, in order to 
infuse its style with a feeling of affinity for the land shared by many traditional 
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Native American cultures.  Native American author, Roberta J. Hill describes 
how engaging in a constant creative struggle helps her realize how ‚a language 
and the earth‛ relate to each other (Hill 1998, 73).   
This struggle begins with her need to believe that language can 
encompass her experiences.  However, that which she strives to express, she 
finds, exceeds the limits of a particular language in a manner similar to the way 
that earth art elementals exceed the grasp of those experiencing them (Hill 1998, 
73).  Regardless of the struggle, Hill and others like her, view language as a 
symbol and conduit for personal connections to particular lands.  These lands 
encompass history and community within their natural elements, generating 
qualities that engender respect and care for the land.  Through these connections, 
a dialogue develops between nature and culture within these societies.  As Hill 
states, ‚*b+y singing and telling stories, we harmonize the inside of ourselves 
with manifestations of the universe‛ (Hill 1998, 74).  This struggle with language 
forms the basis for actions that come to encompass forms of activism since it 
actively engages Hill in the effort of re-envisioning key elements of life and of 
developing moral ways to relate to others, including the environment.     
For Jeannette Armstrong, the unwritten Okanagan language creates a very 
different perception of reality than the one solicited by English, sometimes called 
the enemy’s language because of the way it was forced on indigenous cultures 
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(Armstrong 1998, 191).  Her ancestors believed that land imparted language to 
those living within it, and that the way languages developed occurred because of 
the unique understanding corresponding to the uniqueness of the surrounding 
geography (Armstrong 1998, 175-76).  She asserts that her Okanagan language, 
N’silxchn, 
 recreates sounds of the land in its utterance, but it also draws on the 
 natural human emotional response to sound and rhythm to contain and 
 express a philosophical or spiritual idea.  
(Armstrong 1998, 188) 
   
N’silxchn is embodied—expressed only through the human voice, and replete 
with musical qualities arising from its use of the body (Armstrong 1998, 187-189). 
  Enhanced by a sense of anger at the effects of colonization on language 
and land, Native Americans have become sensitized to injustices.  These 
sensitivities include an understanding of the ‚strong connections between the 
marginalization of people and the degradation of the environment‛ (Adamson 
2001, 109).  Authors often express this perception through the style and subject 
matter of their literature and culture in a way that functions as activism because 
they take a stand through direct action and creative practice that attempts to 
change the structures creating detrimental effects.  For example, Gloria Bird 
encourages testimonials by children and women about Native American 
historical events in an attempt to use the practices of ‚witnessing and testimony‛ 
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to reveal personal responses to colonization in an attempt to foster perceptions 
that support decolonization (Bird 1998, 29).   
Hill, for her part, is most compelled by themes about human relation and 
responsibility to the earth, the necessity of cultivating morality, reinvigorating 
‘subjugated knowledges’, and the cultivation of community (Hill 1998, 74).  
These themes find a voice through practices which encompass artistic ‘seeing’, 
attentiveness, and openness to the earth other.   In fact, since a ‚precise 
geography‛ aids in producing the languages of indigenous peoples, the state of 
the land strongly affects their cultural communities (Armstrong 1998, 178).  An 
understanding of this connection imbues much of their writing with awareness 
of Western dualistic treatment of the environment and strategies for overcoming 
detrimental effects to both perception and physical land.     
 Each author utilizes personal and tribal experiences and reiterates and 
reinterprets them on new terms.  For example, Armstrong tries to imbue English 
language, when she utilizes it, with the movement and the rhythm of her native 
Okanagan language.  Authors consider their writing to work toward ‘survival’, 
by fashioning identities that feel more authentic.  Much of their writing resists 
what Joni Adamson calls, ‚the official landscape,‛ ‚an extraction-oriented 
landscape, imposed by government and corporation on local geographies 
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without regard for local peoples, cultures, or environments‛ (Adamson 2001, 90, 
109).   
What Adamson calls ‚an ecological perspective‛ involves the 
development of ‚a middle place between the local and the universal‛ where 
connection is emphasized (Adamson 2001, 95).  As Hill states, ‚*i+f we don’t 
create, our cultures do not live.  The need to create art and literature and music 
keeps our ways alive and nourishes them.  .  .  Our imaginative life is another 
expression of the earth‛ (Hill 1998, 78).  Their work remains tied to the earth, 
even if they have been detached from their homelands.  They even consider 
themselves to ‚reinvent the enemy’s language,‛ the language forced on them 
through colonization (Armstrong 1998, 175).  Inherent in the reinvention of 
language and the connection to the earth is a need for action and a realization of 
identity springing from the struggle.  Toward this reinvention, Native authors 
create new ways of relating, such as Adamson’s ‘middle place’, that break down 
negative dualistic patterns through cultural practices and the act of writing.     
Tikkun Olam and Jewish American Painters:  Healing the World, Ben Shahn 
 Another brand of activism comes from artistic practices of twentieth 
century Jewish American painters based on tikkun olam, a centuries old Jewish 
tradition of ‚repairing the world;  leaving it a better place than it was when one 
was born into it‛ (Soltes 2003, 39).  In his book, Fixing the World:  Jewish 
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American Painters in the Twentieth Century, Ori Z. Soltes states that an ‚interest 
in the social, and not merely aesthetic, import of art‛ is ‚present to a pronounced 
degree among Jewish American artists‛ (Soltes 2003, ix).  The works that Soltes 
presents range in subject matter from socialism to the sublime, and include 
elements of individual identity and the universal.  While the styles utilized are 
wide ranging, and include representational, conceptual, abstract, chromatic 
expressionist, and abstract expressionist art, regardless of the approach utilized, 
their creators imbue and intertwine an ethical perspective within them.   
 One formidable example is that of Jewish American Realist/Magic Realist 
painter, Ben Shahn, now well-known as an American protest painter.  In 
describing what compels him to communicate through art, Shahn stated, ‚I hate 
injustice.  .  .  I guess it’s about the only thing I really do hate‛ (Soltes 2003, 39).  
Utilizing irony, emphasized through exaggeration of angles and the physical 
attributes of subjects, and a ‚poster-like flattening of perspective‛ in his 
paintings, Shahn created artworks that question the continuity between self and 
world and suggest a curiosity and questioning of ethical perspectives through 
their subject matter and style. 
The painting, ‚Identity,‛ shows ‚five pairs of clenched fists.  .  .  raised 
like Ten Commandments heavenward‛ (Soltes 2003, 43-44).  The hands gesture 
toward the Hebrew quotation:  ‘‛If I am not for myself, who will be for me?  But 
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if I am only for myself, what am I?‛’ (Soltes 2003, 42).  Shahn saw this question 
‚as a statement of his own identity, as individual, family man, member of a 
community and citizen of the United States, Jew and member of the human race‛ 
(Soltes 2003, 42).  This question appears to examine the very essence of ethical 
intersubjectivity and relationships, which, for Shahn, seem to have been of 
fundamental importance.  This stance often brought images and subjects into his 
artistic vocabulary, due to his aspiration to relate his own experience and view of 
contemporary issues to his artistic expression (Pohl 1993, 11). 
   Shahn was personally engaged in many issues of his day.  He was a 
liberal, New Deal artist who utilized his art to support trade unions, Franklin 
Roosevelt’s stand for full employment after the Second World War, and 
international human rights, to name a few causes.  For instance, he questioned 
the outcome of the now infamous trial of two men convicted of murder, Sacco 
and Vanzetti, after groups protested the convictions alleging ‚racial and political 
bias‛ (Pohl 1989, 45).  He created a series of stylized portraits of the two men.  
One of the memorable tableaus shows them in handcuffs in the courtroom, and 
another, portrays them lying in their caskets with the Lowell Committee, which 
had reviewed the court findings, standing over them with sour expressions.  
Compelled to action by the case, Shahn stated,  
‚I’d wished that I’d been lucky enough to be alive at a great time—when 
something big was going on, like the Crucifixion.  And suddenly I 
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realized I was!  Here I was living through another crucifixion.  Here was 
something to paint!‛ 
(Pohl 1993, 12) 
 
Clearly, for Shahn, artistic expression was an activist gesture—a practice in 
which he could reveal his support or opposition of contentious issues in a direct 
way.    
His poster, ‚This is Nazi Brutality‛ from 1942, uses the exact wording of 
part of the German announcement of the destruction of the Czechoslovakian 
village of Lidice, in which most of the inhabitants were shot or taken to 
internment camps (Pohl, 1989).  The words are laid over an anonymous, darkly 
clothed individual with a hood, who stands handcuffed in the corner of a brick 
enclosure.  The bag over the prisoner’s head reaches toward an ominous sky 
above.  The words, ‚This is Nazi brutality,‛ run across the man’s chest.  It is a 
simple presentation, yet bold, one that stimulates a visceral response and a sense 
of empathy for the individual, who is completely covered except for his 
clenched, handcuffed fists.  Shahn’s understanding of the injustice of this 
brutality translates to the viewer of the poster, at least inspiring empathy, at most 
calling for action.      
Shahn, primarily known as a painter, also became interested in 
photography as a way to engage in an unpretentious way with his subjects.  His 
photographic style helped him to avoid the ‚artificiality of posed studio models‛ 
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and to develop ‘‛art of and for the people,‛ an imagery that would literally come 
from the streets and be translated into murals that would, in turn, speak to a 
broad audience’ (Pohl 1993, 15).  He was employed in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Federal Art Project, part of the Works Progress Administration.  The Farm 
Security Administration branch employed him to document U.S. economic 
conditions.  This project produced moving visual evidence that the 
administration used to implement support programs for those in economic need 
(Pohl 1993, 16).  Shahn states that he and the photographers he worked with  
‚had only one purpose—a moral one I suppose.  So we decided:  no angle 
shots, no filters, no mats, nothing glossy but paper.  .  .  Nobody had even 
done it before, deliberately.  .  .  We just took pictures that cried out to be 
taken.‛  
(Pohl 1993, 16)  
 
These works may or may not have affected American culture through an 
‘everyday’ individual’s viewing of and response to them.  They certainly did 
function as activism by affecting the public at large through the awareness of 
injustice that they fostered within certain powerful individuals, as well as 
through the effects of the programs, like those using Shahn’s and other 
photographers’ visual evidence to help those in economic need.  It is also clear 
that by practicing his art, Shahn shaped and transformed, at very least, molded 
his experiences and his perspective and view toward others.  He created an ever-
evolving personal outlook on the world.  He also contributed to society as part of 
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a group of artists within a way of life that formed a basis for reflection on 
intersubjective relationships and activism intended to help raise awareness and 
help those in need.         
Folk Music and the Civil Rights Movement 
 My final example of artistic practice and activism is that of the connection 
between folk music and the American Civil Rights movement.  In Musicking:  
The Meanings of Performing and Listening, Christopher Small states, ‚*f+or 
living creatures.  .  .  the most important information they receive from the 
outside world concerns relationships‛ (Small 1998, 57).  This claim echoes 
Russon’s perspective, previously stated, that it is through physically relating to 
other elements in the world that people begin develop an understanding of the 
world.  Like my claims regarding actively engaging in artistic practices, Small’s 
book asserts the importance of perceiving music as an active practice, ‚a music 
act,‛ that people use to engage with others and world, rather than a static object 
(Small 1998, 8). 
Small emphasizes the mind/body components of making music, and 
introduces the word ‚musicking‛ in order to place an emphasis on music as 
action—one that groups do together—rather than product (Small 1998, 9-10).  
Though music is considered more abstract than other forms of art, feeling music 
in a bodily way comes from the relationships between the elements within it, the 
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resonating sound waves, notes, rhythm, and melody.  Furthermore, music is 
deeply affective, and sound is an entity that is experienced individually and 
communally in concurrence, it therefore, reveals the ability to engage an 
individual holistically through intellect, affect, and body, as well as drawing 
groups of people together through shared experiences.   
 Perhaps these are some of the reasons that music became a partner in the 
American Civil Rights movement.  As Guy and Candie Carawan state in Sing for 
Freedom:  The Story of the Civil Rights Movement Through Its Songs, ‚The civil 
rights movement without its music would have been like a bird without its 
wings‛ (Carawan 2008, xiii).  Singing is bodily, and inherently expressive.  Songs 
contain thoughts, but also generate physical sensations of sound and emotional 
effects on listeners.  The civil rights music is a dramatic example of the holistic 
ethical transformational nature of art.  At first, those within the rights movement 
did not realize the vital necessity for ‚dynamic music‛ within the movement 
(Carawan 2008, xviii).  Soon, it became a force that bonded people within the 
movement together, providing inspiration, solace, and a means of expression, 
and garnering empathy from those outside of the movement. 
 Clearly, a means of forging positive intersubjective ethical relationships, 
the ‚powerful singing.  .  .  became such an integral part of the struggle‛ 
(Carawan 2008, xxii).  Both the movement and the music ‚evolved step by step, 
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creatively, as ordinary people in grassroots communities recognized problems 
and came together to confront them‛ (Carawan 2008, xxii).  These songs brought 
a variety of people together in the pursuit of justice and, today, especially, with 
their meanings intensified through their social history, they continue to rouse 
people to action.  From striking Appalachian miners to Chinese democracy 
campaigners to many other marginalized and subordinated groups, these songs 
continue to evoke powerful effects on the mental, emotional, physical, and 
communal nature of those who engage with them, and to spur the direct action 
of activism in support of their causes (Carawan 2008, xvii).         
Conclusion 
 My purpose in writing about art and ethics comes from my deep love and 
involvement with the arts, in which I have noticed that those sincerely engaged 
in these practices tend toward more aware and relational ways of being.  By 
utilizing a more holistic approach for interacting with other entities, I believe that 
human beings can foster more positive ethical relationships.  By fully engaging 
the mind/heart, one can refine one’s senses, order creative expression, and 
connect with others in a way that honors their differences and, through a deeper 
sense of empathy, attempts to see and feel the interdependence of the other, as 
well as what is needed for its thriving.   
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 In this way, one avoids dualistic conceptual habits in which others are 
seen as undeserving of moral concern, or reduced as means to another’s ends.  
Furthermore, at least some positive elements related to embodied artistic 
practices can be distilled into other activities.  By taking time, learning to look 
and to relate to others, an individual can develop some of these attitudes.  Even 
developing the habit of taking walks in order to begin to observe the play of 
elementals, the activity of animals, and the positive and negative changes in the 
environment, one can begin to foster a long-standing relationship with others. 
 These actions bring engagement and the seeds of change.  Perhaps they 
could even lead to more types of embodied, and possibly artistic, expressions 
that foster a deeper change in the individual, as well as that affect others.  
Furthermore, because art functions to open other’s minds through feeling—it can 
create what Friedrich Schiller called, a ‚common sense,‛ in which humanity 
finds a more holistic type of harmony than one that is merely political (Schiller 
2004, 139).  Beauty’s possession of the power to inspire, may even, at its best, 
inspire epiphanies that can heal cultural wounds, relieve discord between 
aggressors, and with some providence, bring about a new sense of respect for 
earth others.      
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